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ARTICLES 
The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its 
Application to Mandatory Arbitration 
Omri Ben-Shahar† 
Access justice is one of the most appealing and least contentious regulatory 
techniques in law’s repertoire. It aspires to give people equal opportunity to utilize 
certain primary goods, and it does so by assuring openness—that access to these 
goods is not allocated by markets and is not tilted in favor of wealth or privilege. But 
access justice often fails to meet its egalitarian aspirations, because groups that are 
not the intended targets of the intervention deploy access and its benefits dispropor-
tionately. Paradoxically, access justice often benefits various elites while paid for 
directly by taxpayers and indirectly by weaker groups. This Article brings to light 
this unintended and regressive cross-subsidy created by policies of access to infor-
mation, compensation, insurance, accommodations, and more. It then examines in 
detail a specific contemporary access justice paradox—consumers’ access to courts 
and the impact of mandatory arbitration agreements that limit such access. This 
Article demonstrates that access to courts is a franchise of the elite and of little value 
to weak consumers. Nevertheless, it considers whether contractual waivers of access 
to courts hurt weak consumers by foreclosing effective access through class-action 
representatives. This concern has theoretical merit, but it, too, is limited in ways that 
are often unappreciated. 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1756 
A. Access Justice .............................................................................. 1756 
B. Access to Justice: Limits on Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements .................................................................................. 1761 
I.ACCESS JUSTICE AND REDISTRIBUTION ........................................................... 1763 
A. The Regressive Possibility .......................................................... 1763 
B. Regressive Public Expenditures ................................................. 1768 
C. Sources of Access Handicaps ...................................................... 1771 
 
 † Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am 
grateful to Michael Abramowicz, Oren Bar-Gill, Ryan Bubb, William Hubbard, Adam 
Levitin, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Barak Richman, Raaj Sah, Sonja Starr, David Weisbach, 
Lauren Willis, Kathy Zeiler, and workshop participants at Boston University, The University 
of Chicago, the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin, Northwestern University, Sciences 
Po in Paris, and the University of Toronto for commenting on an earlier draft, and to Irit 
Brodsky and Holly Newell for research assistance. 
 1756 The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1755 
   
1. Cost handicaps: Implicit nonprice fees. ............................... 1771 
2. Network handicaps: Connectedness to a grid. ..................... 1772 
3. Information handicap: Understanding the access 
privilege. ................................................................................ 1773 
4. Benefit handicaps: The differential value of access............. 1775 
5. Affordability handicaps: The effect of small fees. ................ 1776 
D. Regressive Legal Institutions ..................................................... 1779 
1. Mandated disclosure. ............................................................ 1779 
2. Mandated compensation. ...................................................... 1782 
3. Mandated insurance. ............................................................ 1785 
4. Mandated accommodations. ................................................. 1789 
5. Preservation of open space. .................................................. 1792 
II.ACCESS TO COURTS ....................................................................................... 1794 
A. The Debate over Mandatory Arbitration .................................... 1795 
B. The Litigation Cross-Subsidy ..................................................... 1798 
1. Who benefits from access to courts? ..................................... 1799 
2. Who pays for access to courts? .............................................. 1804 
3. Corrective versus distributive justice. ................................. 1805 
4. “Vicarious access”: The class action externality. ................. 1807 
5. Access to courts: Conclusion. ................................................ 1815 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 1816 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Access Justice 
Equal access is one of the most appealing and least conten-
tious regulatory techniques in law’s repertoire. Equal access as-
pires to give people even entitlement to certain primary goods or 
opportunities, and it does so by assuring openness—that access 
to these entitlements is not allocated by market prices and is not 
tilted in favor of wealth or privilege. Equal access is often secured 
by public expenditures that finance free entry for all, but it is also 
accomplished by mandates requiring providers to charge uniform 
affordable prices or offer uniform accommodations. 
Some of the classic public goods are delivered via the equal 
access method: education, transportation, and parks. Public 
schools are open and free, guaranteeing baseline access to educa-
tion to all citizens. Roads and commuter services stretch out to all 
communities and are also mostly free to use. And parks and water-
fronts are held in the public trust, operated by the community and 
open to all. Funded by the taxpayers, bolstered occasionally by 
token usage fees, schools, roads, and parks are equally accessible. 
 2016] The Paradox of Access Justice 1757 
 
Equal access is also a popular device in protective laws. Pro-
tective laws are legal regimes that seek to help weaker groups in 
society function better, enjoy more opportunity, and reach better 
outcomes. Laws requiring that people with disabilities be afforded 
equal access to buildings are a prominent example of this regula-
tory technique. So are policies and laws that require universal ac-
cess to some forms of community banking and credit, personal 
health and property insurance, and necessity goods. Many other 
protective laws utilize the equal access technique, seeking to 
guarantee universal access to a variety of goods and services, in-
cluding information, knowledge, the Internet, medicine, safety, 
compensation, and courts. These policies are often based on the 
highly plausible prediction that, in the absence of such mandates 
of open and equal access, weaker groups would fare worse. 
There is a strong and alluring notion of equality underlying 
various access policies. If these goods and services were subject to 
market allocations, instead of being accessible to all through gov-
ernment mandates (and funding), the poor and the less sophisti-
cated would be disproportionately priced out. Equal access ena-
bles those who could not otherwise afford to pay the true cost of 
these services to consume the subsidized good. It thus promotes a 
fundamental element of a liberal society—equal opportunity. 
Equal access is alluring also because it is protective but not 
heavily paternalistic. True, it is more intrusive than some other 
regulation-lite techniques, such as mandated disclosure or the 
use of “choice architecture,”1 because it mandates a baseline enti-
tlement and limits opt-out, and thus interferes more aggressively 
with (and often replaces) private markets. But it is less intrusive 
than other command-and-control regulatory policies that go be-
yond the provision of access and mandate the quality or equality 
of outcomes. 
Undoubtedly, some equal access policies have had important 
effects, helping disadvantaged groups. The days in which only the 
privileged could obtain education or have access to health care are 
gone. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a liberal society with-
out the guarantee of equal access to such core institutions. Many 
of the accomplishments of equal access are now taken for granted, 
regarded as the cornerstones of a just and fair society, and 
rightly so. 
 
 1 See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 81–100 (Yale 2008). 
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But at the frontier of present-day protective law there hover 
various equal access policies with a more dubious foundation and 
a less encouraging success record. These are policies that secure 
free or subsidized access to all, but that some subgroups of people 
enjoy disproportionately. Paid for by all, but enjoyed by the few, 
these policies represent a cross-subsidy. This cross-subsidy may 
be desirable when the beneficiaries are a subgroup of the weak 
consumers who are the intended target of the redistributive con-
cerns. This, for example, is the result of Medicaid and housing 
assistance programs. The poor are the primary recipients, and the 
programs redistribute wealth to reduce overall poverty. But the 
cross-subsidy is undesirable and unintended when the beneficiar-
ies are the elite and when the benefits are paid for by the less 
privileged. It is the surprising prevalence of such unintended con-
sequences that this Article exposes. 
This question—the differential effect of protective laws 
among groups of consumers—is not often addressed by legal com-
mentators. It is quite well understood that legal mandates in-
tended to benefit consumers can impose costs that may be passed 
on to these consumers through higher prices, with adverse dis-
tributive consequences. Prior literature provided several criteria 
to predict the winners and losers from cost pass-ons of mandatory 
rules.2 
But in the area of mandated access, the redistributive effect 
is rarely studied. Instead, it is often assumed that mandated ac-
cess policies, even if they come at some cost, are mostly beneficial 
to the least privileged and most needy among consumers—those 
whose access might otherwise be denied. Thus, a common re-
sponse to perceptions of disadvantage and deprivation in con-
sumer and employment markets is to prop up the legal protec-
tions. Mandating important transactional rights for consumers or 
employees is thought to guarantee “access justice.” The weaker 
parties, who are otherwise “excluded from the market,” would be 
able to “participate in and reap the benefits of the [market].”3 Sim-
ilarly, another prominent access concern is “access to 
 
 2 See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distri-
bution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan L Rev 361, 372–95 (1991). 
 3 Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in Hans-W. Micklitz, ed, The Many Concepts of 
Social Justice in European Private Law 3, 5, 36 (Elgar 2011). 
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knowledge”—shorthand for the right to use and participate in me-
diums of information and expression.4 In intellectual property 
law, a “social movement” of access to knowledge views the limita-
tions imposed on users by software vendors or patent holders as 
unfair, calling for lawmakers to guarantee open access.5 Net neu-
trality—open access to the Internet—is another logical implica-
tion of access to knowledge.6 These access-to-knowledge initia-
tives are founded on the empirical assumption that the 
beneficiaries of such protections are otherwise weaker than mar-
ket participants who desire to restrict (and charge for) access. 
I need a term for this paradigm, prevalent across all of law, 
that favors mandated equal access as a regulatory method. “Ac-
cess justice” seems direct and descriptive.7 It includes a variety of 
views across many regulatory areas, and it is therefore a general-
ization. But it is a useful generalization because so many lawmak-
ers and commentators embrace some version of mandated equal 
access across a broad array of substantive issues. 
It is so commonly assumed that access justice benefits the 
weak that the premise has escaped any significant scrutiny. Ob-
viously, the belief that access justice is progressive is deeply held 
among liberals, who rely on it to advocate equal access reforms, 
such as access to banking for the poor.8 But conservatives too ac-
cept the descriptive logic of access justice, even when opposing it 
on normative grounds. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, ex-
plains that strong consumer protections—proposed by the European 
Union and widely supported by access justice advocates—are 
likely to benefit weak consumers. Epstein is ready to “assume 
that the less-sophisticated half of . . . consumers stand to benefit 
from the [protective] regulation and the more-sophisticated half 
 
 4 See Access to Knowledge (Information Society Project, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/J9S4-Z8TG. 
 5 See, for example, Gaëlle Krikorian, Access to Knowledge as a Field of Activism, in 
Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski, eds, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual 
Property 57, 68–74 (Zone 2010). 
 6 See, for example, Charter for Innovation, Creativity and Access to Knowledge 
(FCForum, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/GA5U-RRGS; Angele A. Gilroy, Access to 
Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality Debate *1 (Congressional Research Service, July 
1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SAY7-PUHX. 
 7 For an example of the use of the term “access justice” in the literature, see Micklitz, 
Introduction at 5 (cited in note 3) (using “access justice” to describe the European Union’s 
model of social justice). 
 8 See generally, for example, Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J Reg 121 
(2004) (arguing for the progressive benefits of increasing low-income families’ access to 
banking services). 
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. . . are hurt by them, in equal degrees.”9 He thus views such ac-
cess policies as “an implicit cross-subsidy of weak consumers by 
their stronger counterparts.”10 This is an intuitive assumption 
that no longer seems to require justification. Surely, mandatory 
consumer protections that secure access to markets and to core 
commercial rights greatly benefit weaker consumers who need 
them more direly. Sophisticated consumers are less reliant on ac-
cess mandates because they can bargain for them more effectively 
or pay for access when necessary. Indeed, writing about equality 
of opportunity—the political ideal that is the foundation of access 
justice policies—Professor Robert Nozick conceded that such pol-
icies were either “directly worsening the situations of those more 
favored with opportunity” or “improving the situation of those less 
well-favored.”11 
The view that mandated access justice helps the weak is 
therefore widely shared and rests on highly plausible logic. My 
goal in this Article is to challenge this view. I argue that in an 
important range of activity, it is false. It relies on superficial logic 
that can be debunked, and it is inconsistent with a large body of 
existing empirical evidence. Rather than helping the weak, access 
justice policies could be regressive, benefitting stronger consum-
ers disproportionately, at times at the direct expense of the weak. 
This is the paradox of access justice. 
The argument I present is simple. Access justice is merely an 
equality of opportunity, not of outcome. Some can draw on that 
opportunity better than others can. If those who take advantage 
of the open access and opportunity are disproportionately more 
sophisticated and affluent, the benefit of the program ceases to be 
progressive. And if the funding of such free programs burdens the 
poor, the result can be outright regressive. 
Consider, for example, free and open access to a parking lot 
outside the city opera. Only people with cars, and mostly those 
attending the opera, would benefit from the opportunity. This 
rules out the poorest, who do not own cars in the first place, as 
well as anyone else other than opera lovers. When the mayor de-
cides to start charging market prices for parking in the lot, she 
may be eliminating free and equal access, but she is hardly hurt-
ing the poor or working class community. She is merely ending a 
 
 9 Richard A. Epstein, Harmonization, Heterogeneity and Regulation: CESL, the Lost 
Opportunity for Constructive Harmonization, 50 Common Mkt L Rev 207, 213 (2013). 
 10 Id at 213–14. 
 11 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 235 (Basic Books 1974). 
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subsidy that flows from all taxpayers to a small, highly educated, 
and relatively affluent elite group.12 
I present in Part I of this Article a number of important social 
and legal policies that mirror the opera parking metaphor. I show, 
for example, that the long-standing federal scheme of subsidized 
flood insurance, which is commonly justified on grounds of access 
justice, is in fact a regressive policy, which provides subsidies to 
the more affluent homeowners at the expense of the generally less 
affluent taxpayers. The method I use to analyze this and other 
access justice policies is to identify who are the likely beneficiaries 
of the access program. Are there implicit “access handicaps”—
structural bars to entry—that afflict some populations? Does the 
afflicted population that fails to realize the benefits of access con-
sist primarily of the poor or other weak sectors? I also ask who 
pays for the programs that are selectively utilized. Are the costs 
spread widely on all taxpayers or all broadly defined potential users, 
thus creating a subsidy from low-value users to high-value users? 
In presenting the paradox of access justice, I stop short of 
making a general claim that access justice policies are doomed to 
be unfair. As stated at the opening, numerous long-standing ac-
cess mandates—like public education and public housing—help 
more and charge less those who can least afford such basic goods. 
The claim I develop is that access justice is a mixed bag. People 
often assume that it is enough to enact open access to achieve the 
desired redistribution. Recognizing the patterns of access handi-
caps corrects this misperception. I show that the cross-subsidy 
can go the wrong direction in systematic ways, and I trace this 
misalignment to various important access justice policies. By 
showing the recurrent failure of access justice, and the real possi-
bility of a regressive bias, I hope to repudiate its mythic stature 
as a formula for consumer protection. 
B. Access to Justice: Limits on Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements 
After introducing the potential general problem with access 
justice, the second Part of this Article (Part II) zooms in on one of 
the most contentious access justice debates of our time—access to 
courts. The problem of access to courts—sometimes referred to as 
 
 12 See Joni Maya Cherbo and Monnie Peters, American Participation in Opera and 
Musical Theater—1992 3–6 (Seven Locks 1995) (describing the demographic profile of the 
3.3 percent of Americans who saw one or more operas during 1992). 
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access to justice13—addresses the legality of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements. These agreements are often included in con-
sumer and employment contracts, stipulating that any dispute 
must be resolved through arbitration procedures, thus barring 
any access to courts. An important upshot of the denial of access 
to courts is the shutdown of class actions as a method for vindi-
cating consumers’ and employees’ common complaints. 
Here, as in other areas of access justice laws, it is commonly 
assumed that mandatory arbitration clauses indeed hurt poten-
tial plaintiffs. Accordingly, the first step in Part II, after describ-
ing the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration agreements, is to 
show that access to courts is yet another access justice policy that 
distributes benefits to some more than others. Surveying a large 
social science literature on access to courts, I present the possibil-
ity that access to courts is a privilege disproportionately deployed 
by sophisticated consumers, and almost never by the poor. In such 
cases, I argue, the denial of access to courts affects the sophisti-
cated elite more than it affects others. Further, if the costs of law-
suits are spread evenly across all consumers who all pay higher 
prices, then in effect access to courts is a regressive access justice 
policy, benefitting the affluent at the expense of others. 
Viewed in this light, contracts containing mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses eliminate the cross-subsidy. And, conversely, laws 
that prohibit or strike down such mandatory arbitration clauses 
restore access to courts but also restore the cross-subsidy. By re-
instating the access-to-courts privilege, such laws force all con-
sumers to pay for a benefit enjoyed only by the elite. If I am a poor 
consumer unlikely to go to court, I do not benefit from access to 
courts, and I might be worse off for it, by having to pay higher 
prices. 
But there is more. The second step in evaluating access-to-
courts laws is to reassess this conclusion in light of the effect of 
litigation through class actions. Even when initiated only by the 
sophisticated few, class actions can benefit all consumers, either 
by securing class-wide redress or by generating incentives for 
firms to provide safer and better products to all consumers (in-
cluding nonlitigants). This possibility raises the specter of vicarious 
access—enjoying the value of access justice not in directly visiting 
the open forum but in piggybacking on the visitation by others. If 
 
 13 See, for example, Office for Access to Justice Home (DOJ), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/9JAJ-U4XU. 
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this form of access is beneficial for all consumers, mandatory ar-
bitration clauses that eliminate class actions hurt consumers as 
a group, not merely those with the propensity to sue. 
The question whether class actions indeed create vicarious 
access is empirically open. The last Section of Part II lays out the 
contrasting conjectures regarding actual dissemination of the 
benefits of class litigation. It concludes that despite the class-wide 
effect of access to courts, subtle cross-subsidies may nevertheless 
afflict this institution. It shows that in a variety of contexts, ac-
cess to courts—even vicariously—does not benefit large groups of 
less sophisticated, less affluent consumers. 
I.  ACCESS JUSTICE AND REDISTRIBUTION 
A. The Regressive Possibility 
Access justice is never equal. Some utilize the access more 
than others. They visit the open forum more often, enjoy the goods 
or services made accessible through the open forum more thor-
oughly, and use these accessible opportunities more effectively as 
a gateway to other advantages. When the price of entry is fixed 
(often at zero) and does not reflect such differential benefits, the 
program is redistributive. 
Thus, the fundamental distributive question is—who are the 
beneficiaries of open access? Can they be identified systemati-
cally? And, of course, to evaluate the overall distributive footprint 
of the program, we also need to know who pays for it. Whose re-
sources are taxed to pay for the subsidized access? 
In some important cases, the cross-subsidy brought about by 
access justice is indeed progressive, favoring low-income people. 
This is largely the case with respect to primary school education 
in most big American cities, as well as access to emergency medi-
cal care or to city parks (although proximity to city parks affects 
housing prices14 and might render the parks more accessible to 
the wealthy). In the public school context, two important sources 
of funding are property and income taxes, which are paid largely 
by higher-income property owners.15 And public schools are more 
 
 14 John L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the Em-
pirical Evidence, 33 J Leisure Rsrch 1, 28 (2001). 
 15 See Jennifer Von Pohlmann, Property Tax Rates Highest for Homeowners Who 
Have Owned between Five and 15 Years, Own High-End or Low-End Homes (RealtyTrac, 
Mar 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9BP3-8NGU (stating that those with the highest-
value homes pay the highest percentage of their property value to property tax and that 
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likely to be attended by low-income people, because higher-income 
families are more likely to opt out for private education.16 Like-
wise, emergency medical care (and access to urban trauma care 
centers in particular) benefits many low-income and underinsured 
groups, while largely funded by others.17 And the same is true for 
city parks and beaches, more likely destinations of low-income 
residents who cannot afford remote and luxurious vacation desti-
nations. These are funded not primarily by entry fees but instead 
by taxes and private donations.18 
In another important class of cases, the direction of the cross-
subsidy could systematically favor the middle class. Professor 
George Stigler called this “Director’s Law of Public Income Redis-
tribution” (after Professor Aaron Director’s empirical conjecture), 
arguing that public expenditures are often made for the primary 
benefit of the middle class, funded by taxes borne disproportion-
ately by the rich and the poor.19 Stigler suggested that social se-
curity and tax exemptions for churches are examples of such pro-
middle-class redistribution. Social security, for example, taxes 
most heavily, relative to the benefits they will receive, those who 
begin work early (instead of continuing in school) or those who die 
early, all favoring the middle class. Low-income taxpayers pay in 
a larger share of their income, and, Stigler argued, because they 
don’t live as long after retirement, they fail to reap the benefits of 
the payouts.20 
 
higher-end homes account for over half of the property tax nationwide). See also Jane 
Wells, The Rich Do Not Pay the Most Taxes, They Pay All the Taxes (CNBC, Dec 11, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5GK2-EBWM. 
 16 The Chicago Public Schools website reports that 86 percent of students enrolled in 
the city’s public schools in 2014 came from low-income families. See CPS Stats and Facts 
(Chicago Public Schools, Jan 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/83WS-JEKY. 
 17 See Amy Knowlton, et al, Patient Demographic and Health Factors Associated with 
Frequent Use of Emergency Medical Services in a Midsized City, 20 Academic Emergency 
Med 1101, 1102 (2013) (noting that “persons with Medicaid or Medicare coverage are 
overrepresented among frequent [emergency department] users”); Tamyra Carroll Garcia, 
Amy B. Bernstein, and Mary Ann Bush, Emergency Department Visitors and Visits: Who 
Used the Emergency Room in 2007? *1 (National Center for Health Statistics, May 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/L2AD-6AJK; January Angeles, Insuring All Americans Is a 
Critical Component of an Efficient, High Quality Health Care System *2 (Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, Apr 21, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/C59Z-XATG. 
 18 See Margaret Walls, Private Funding of Public Parks: Assessing the Role of Phi-
lanthropy *8 (Resources for the Future, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ABQ9-WW7C. 
 19 George J. Stigler, Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J L & Econ 
1, 1–4 (1970). 
 20 Id at 3. See also Geoffrey T. Holtz, Social Security Discrimination against African 
Americans: An Equal Protection Argument, in Lawrence A. Frolik, ed, Aging and the Law: 
An Interdisciplinary Reader 111, 112–14 (Temple 1999). 
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But there is a third possibility that has not been systemati-
cally treated—and it is the most problematic one—whereby the 
cross-subsidy from access justice programs benefits the elite. It is 
this paradox that this Article explores. This arises whenever the 
benefits of programs that are at least partially paid for by taxpay-
ers accrue disproportionately to the relatively wealthy. If every-
one in society is asked to contribute equally to support a program, 
but the affluent utilize that program more frequently, it will ef-
fectively transfer wealth from the poor to the rich. 
The regressive cross-subsidy is rarely an intended effect. Un-
like progressive welfare programs that are intended to reduce 
poverty, regressive programs do not declare a goal to increase the 
well-being of the wealthy. Progressive policies like food stamps 
openly and unabashedly select their beneficiaries according to in-
come. Regressive policies, by contrast, do not employ an explicit 
selection criterion to rule in solely the affluent and rule out oth-
ers. Formally, these programs allow access to all, often accompa-
nied by egalitarian rhetoric.21 The pattern of selective utilization 
that develops is subtler and less salient. It is only when the ben-
efits to the wealthy from the program turn out to exceed the tax 
and access fees they pay that a net regressive distribution occurs. 
Accordingly, regressivity, as used here (and in the public fi-
nance literature), has two facets. The first measures how the ben-
efits of the policy are distributed. Whenever poorer populations 
utilize these benefits at a less-than-proportional rate, the policy 
is regressive.22 This is a weak sense of regressivity, because the 
funding for the policy might come from progressive taxes, sug-
gesting that the overall redistribution does not hurt the poor. The 
affluent pay more for those benefits that they also happen to ac-
cess more readily. 
The second criterion of regressivity represents a stronger, 
and more troubling, form of inequality. It measures the effect of a 
 
 21 See Peter H. Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting in Social Programs: 
Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples 42–43 (Brookings 2006). Professors Peter H. 
Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser consider poorly tailored social policies, including re-
gressive policies. They point to a specific access justice policies—for example, subsidized 
student loans—as “bad polic[ies]” that redistribute wealth regressively. See id at 41 n 60. 
 22 See, for example, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, Introduction, 
in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds, Global Public Goods: Interna-
tional Cooperation in the 21st Century xix, xxix–xxxii (Oxford 1999). See also Tomás Serebrisky, 
et al, Affordability and Subsidies in Public Urban Transport: What Do We Mean, What 
Can Be Done?, 29 Transport Revs 715, 733–35 (2009) (concluding that supply-side trans-
portation subsidies are “neutral or regressive” in their effects in part because the poor 
choose to walk more than the nonpoor). 
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particular public expenditures program on the overall inequality 
of income and welfare distribution.23 Here, the assessment that 
expenditures are regressive is made not only on the basis of how 
the benefits are distributed, but also on the basis of who pays for 
them. The elite now pay less for the benefits that they access more 
readily. For example, tax revenues collected from middle- and 
low-income earners are used to fund, in part, the program for the 
wealthy.24 
Before turning to examine actual regressive access justice 
policies, a fundamental theoretical question needs to be ad-
dressed. Why, it may be asked, is it troubling that individual pro-
grams are regressive? Is it useful or even wise to assess the dis-
tributional equity of each specific policy? Governments, after all, 
produce a large portfolio of public goods, some to benefit the poor 
and others to benefit the affluent. If these programs are welfare-
enhancing overall, should they be abandoned when the benefits 
are allocated inequitably? In fact, identifying a few isolated re-
gressive programs is misleading because redistribution should be 
measured by the overall effect of all programs. Some citizens ben-
efit from program A, others from program B, and it is the com-
bined effect of A and B that should be assessed. 
Further, it may be argued, any regressive redistributive ef-
fect could be corrected by adequately designing the income tax 
burdens. Affluent suburbanites may not pay directly for their dis-
proportionate use of highways or remote parks, but their higher 
income could be taxed more heavily.25 Thus, if building suburban 
highways or marinas for yachts is welfare increasing, it ought to 
be done notwithstanding its correctable distributive effect. 
 
 23 See Udo Ebert and Georg Tillmann, Distribution-Neutral Provision of Public 
Goods, 29 Soc Choice & Welfare 107, 108 (2007) (“Distribution neutrality requires that the 
. . . original income distribution and [ ] the new one, which also takes into account the net 
benefits, are identical.”). 
 24 For an example of such a policy, see Part I.D.6 (discussing the Massachusetts Com-
munity Preservation Act, a program funded by lump sum fees on all deed registry trans-
actions but benefitting only a few high-income communities that engage in land conservation). 
 25 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than 
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 668 (1994) (“[R]edistribu-
tion through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax 
system and typically is less efficient.”). See also generally Steven Shavell, A Note on Effi-
ciency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter 
given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 414 (1981) (ar-
guing that it is preferable to redistribute wealth through taxation, rather than through 
legal rules, even if the system of income taxation is imperfect). 
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My purpose here is not to enter the normative debate over the 
proper scope and method for redistribution. Rather, my goal is 
descriptive: identify (in Parts I.D and II) the otherwise-unnoticed 
distributive effects of specific legal policies. Access justice policies 
are advocated, and their subsidies are enacted, with express dis-
tributive goals supported by progressive sentiments. Some poli-
cies are enacted to guarantee greater participation and equality 
within societal institutions—an effect that cannot be similarly ad-
vanced by a mere transfer of cash, or tax benefits, to the target 
groups. This justification relies critically on the relative rates of 
utilization of the access privileges. Unintended regressive effects 
should, therefore, inform the choice of such policies. Since my ul-
timate goal here is to evaluate the equity of specific regulatory 
regimes that mandate access as a form of protection for weaker 
consumers or employees, the direction of the distributive effect 
seems to be crucial. 
Moreover, while regressive effects of access justice policies 
could in theory be offset by proper adjustments of income tax bur-
dens, lawmaking does not regularly work this way. Some fiscal 
programs may be bundled politically with shifting tax burdens, 
but numerous laws and policies are enacted singly, unaccompa-
nied by an income tax overhaul. If, as I suggest in the following 
Section, some important access justice laws turn out to be regres-
sive, it would be difficult to imagine that lawmakers would re-
spond by increasing income tax on the benefitting subgroup, to 
offset the cross-subsidy. 
Finally, even if redistribution can be done more effectively 
and efficiently through direct fiscal means, and even if its overall 
goals are determined in the aggregate on the basis of some exter-
nal principles of equity, one would still need to know how various 
legal rules and policies affect the different groups. Knowledge of 
their distributive effects is important so that the income tax sys-
tem can be calibrated to achieve the desired level of redistribution 
and to correct for disproportionate benefits that some subgroups 
obtain elsewhere. Access justice is assumed to be egalitarian and 
even progressive, a substitute to direct fiscal redistribution, thus 
necessitating less, not more, corrective progressive taxation. But 
if the regressive effects were prevalent, the opposite would be 
true: redistributive taxes would be all the more necessary. In 
short, society cannot achieve its desired overall level of redistri-
bution if it miscounts the effects of some access justice programs. 
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B. Regressive Public Expenditures 
Having established that regressive redistribution is a theo-
retical possibility, I now turn to demonstrate some examples of 
economic programs that illustrate this possibility. These exam-
ples will help develop, in Section C, a richer understanding of the 
mechanisms that cause selective utilization of access. Later, in 
Section D, with the understanding of such mechanisms, I exam-
ine some fundamental legal rules and policies that fit the regres-
sive pattern. Here, at the outset, the illustrations come from fiscal 
and budgetary programs. 
Consider public expenditures that supply open access to re-
mote parks, libraries, or museums. To access a remote national 
park, people need to travel a distance, and those with cars, leisure 
time, appreciation for nature, and disposable income to pay the 
cost of travel and special gear are more likely to access the remote 
park. State and national parks are indeed open and free to all 
(with an occasional small entrance fee), but because they require 
transportation and travel gear, they are largely inaccessible to 
most lower-income residents of cities.26 Access is subject to an im-
plicit cost of approach, and the more remote the location is, the 
costlier to access. Public expenditure on maintaining free access 
to remote vacation spots is regressive, at least in the weak sense 
(in that the benefits accrue disproportionately to the better-off). 
Roads and subsidized city parking lots may also be regressive 
in the weak sense. Usage rates of open roads and parking lots are 
higher among middle- and upper-income residents.27 The poor are 
less likely to drive and park cars, and thus benefit less from high-
ways and free lots. Many among the poor do not drive or commute 
(due to disability, poverty, or joblessness), and many who do com-
mute work close to home.28 Even public transportation could be 
 
 26 See Patricia A. Taylor, Burke D. Grandjean, and James H. Gramann, National 
Park Service Comprehensive Survey of the American Public: 2008–2009; Racial and Ethnic 
Diversity of National Park System Visitors and Non-visitors *11 (National Park Service, 
Natural Resource Stewardship and Science, July 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Y7MF 
-PZHJ (finding that the cost of hotels and food is the leading reason people do not visit 
national parks more frequently). 
 27 See Lisa Schweitzer and Brian D. Taylor, Just Pricing: The Distributional Effects 
of Congestion Pricing and Sales Taxes, 35 Transp 797, 805, 808 (2008). 
 28 See Paul Ong and Evelyn Blumenberg, Job Access, Commute and Travel Burden 
among Welfare Recipients, 35 Urban Stud 77, 82 (1998) (showing that Los Angeles welfare 
recipients’ median commute was 7.5 miles, as opposed to an average of 16 miles for all 
workers). See also Brian McKenzie, Who Drives to Work? Commuting by Automobile in the 
United States: 2013 *18–19 (US Census Bureau, Aug 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y3G7-86TA. 
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regressive if not targeting struggling neighborhoods directly, for 
example, by improving a neighborhood’s access to infrastructure 
(such as a new metro stop in a poor neighborhood).29 
More generally, public programs that promote access to basic 
utilities in developing countries have had difficulty reaching the 
neediest populations. Access to energy is often promoted through 
price subsidies or unbilled consumption—the paradigmatic 
quantity-based subsidies (ones that are proportional to the 
amount of the service consumed)—but have been shown to be re-
gressive. One World Bank study bemoaned the “perverse situa-
tion, in which higher-income consumers receive benefits they do 
not need . . . leaving few or no resources to expand access.”30 An-
other World Bank study of utility subsidies found that, of the 
twenty-six subsidies considered, none were progressive. “The no-
tion that [the studied price subsidies are] inherently pro-poor is 
clearly a misconception.”31 Many nonpoor households receive the 
subsidy, and many poor households are excluded because they are 
not connected to the system from which access—and the sub-
sidy—is drawn. In African countries, this is the pattern found for 
water and electricity subsidies: “poor households are less likely 
than the population as a whole to have [the] water and electricity 
connections” that are necessary to access and enjoy the program.32 
In developed countries, this is the pattern with other programs—
like roads and transportation—that are accessed less by the poor, 
or from which the poor consume less than the wealthy. In these 
countries, road and transportation policies that eliminate free, 
open access—for example, collection of tolls—are often found to 
be progressive overall.33 A California study estimated that road 
 
 29 For example, 73 percent of Metro rail passengers in Washington, DC, have annual 
household incomes of $75,000 or more, whereas only 47 percent of bus passengers have 
similar incomes. See Steven Ginsberg and Laura Stanton, Would Anyone Win If Metro 
Raised Fares? (Wash Post, Sept 16, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/FA5Q-P4M8. 
 30 Enrique Croussilat, Richard Hamilton, and Pedro Antmann, Addressing the Elec-
tricity Access Gap *12 (World Bank, June 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/V4S5-3VAK. 
 31 Kristin Komives, et al, Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility 
Subsidies? *70–71 (World Bank, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/5TR5-UN3A. 
 32 Id at *77. See also Kristin Komives, Dale Whittington, and Xun Wu, Access to 
Utilities by the Poor: A Global Perspective *15–16 (World Institute for Development Eco-
nomics Research Discussion Paper No 2001/15, June 2001), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MS4S-EMSZ. 
 33 See David Banister, Equity and Acceptability Questions in Internalising the Social 
Costs of Transport, in Internalising the Social Costs of Transport 153, 158–60 (European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport 1994); Jonas Eliasson and Lars-Göran Mattsson, Eq-
uity Effects of Congestion Pricing: Quantitative Methodology and a Case Study for Stockholm, 
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tolls reduce the sales tax burden that the lowest income group 
would otherwise have to bear.34 Free access to the highways is 
thus regressive in the strong sense. 
Further, if people of middle income (and up) not only use 
transportation more, but also gain a disproportionate connection 
through it to income-producing opportunities, thereby crowding 
out the poor, then the open roads and transportation policies may 
be regressive in the stronger sense, of increasing the overall de-
gree of inequality.35 It is difficult to make this case empirically, 
and I suspect that the experience of different localities may vary.36 
Indeed, some American cities can be regarded as testaments to 
how a system of publicly maintained freeways facilitate urban 
flight to suburbs, harming the economic vitality of the central city 
and the well-being of its low-income residents.37 
Similarly, to access a public library and even more so a mu-
seum, people have to appreciate literature and the fine arts, a 
trait that is correlated with income, and they have to be part of 
social networks that reward fluency in these media. Surely, some 
of the services offered by public libraries, like free computer and 
Internet access to local residents, are progressive—benefitting 
low-income people who may not have similar connectivity at 
home.38 But other services, for example, the maintenance of ex-
pensive collections of rare works, benefit more the elites.39 If they 
 
40 Transp Rsrch Pt A 602, 604 (2006). For a helpful review of the literature, see generally 
David Levinson, Equity Effects of Road Pricing: A Review, 30 Transport Revs 33 (2010). 
 34 See Schweitzer and Taylor, 35 Transp at 806 (cited in note 27). 
 35 Todd Litman and Marc Brenman, A New Social Equity Agenda for Sustainable 
Transportation *6 (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Mar 8, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L2E7-7QWJ (“[I]f roads and parking facilities are not financed by user fees 
(tolls, parking fees and increased fuel taxes) they must be financed by general taxes and 
building rents that everybody pays regardless of how much they drive, which is unfair and 
regressive.”). 
 36 Kristin Komives and her coauthors argued that, although the utility subsidies in 
the states they studied were regressive, “they are less regressive than the distribution of 
income in the states. This finding indicates that the subsidies contribute to reducing inequal-
ity, even when the distribution of subsidy benefits is regressive.” Komives, et al, Water, 
Electricity, and the Poor at *143 (cited in note 31). 
 37 See Joe T. Darden, et al, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development xi (Temple 1987) 
(noting that “the economic decline of central cities and the economic rise of the suburbs 
[was] a redistribution facilitated by the massive construction of interstate highways”). 
 38 See Thom File and Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 
2013 *4–5 (US Census Bureau, Nov 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NN2K-3UDP 
(showing that low-income families are less likely to have a computer or Internet access in 
their homes). 
 39 See Paul J. DiMaggio, The Museum and the Public, in Martin Feldstein, ed, The 
Economics of Art Museums 39, 39–41 (Chicago 1991); Juan Prieto-Rodríguez and Víctor 
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are funded largely by wealthy philanthropists, museums may be 
regressive only in the weak sense—benefitting the affluent more, 
without increasing inequality. However, tax credits for the phil-
anthropic class are a form of public expenditure, constituting a 
transfer from the general budget that funds all programs to the 
budget of cultural institutions that cater largely to the well-to-do, 
well-educated patrons.40 
C. Sources of Access Handicaps 
The theoretical case laid out in Section A and the examples 
in Section B reveal a phenomenon that is sometimes called “ac-
cess handicap”41—when some groups are systematically less likely 
to enter and utilize open sites. What are these access handicaps? 
What are the impediments that afflict some groups, stopping 
them from exercising their access rights? This Section explores 
the systematic access handicaps that prevent some groups from 
fully utilizing their access rights. 
1. Cost handicaps: Implicit nonprice fees. 
A site may be free to enter but costly to reach. The example 
above of a remotely located but publicly funded national park in-
volves an implicit screening fee—the cost of travel to reach the 
park.42 Free higher education (in places where it is the norm) may 
require enormous private costs to qualify. Chinese elite universi-
ties, for example, are heavily subsidized. But the selection process 
is so demanding that Chinese families spend years and enormous 
 
Fernández-Blanco, Optimal Pricing and Grant Policies for Museums, 30 J Cultural Econ 
169, 169–70 (2006). 
 40 See Alan L. Feld, Michael O’Hare, and J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Patrons despite 
Themselves: Taxpayers and Arts Policy 75 (NYU 1983); Alan L. Feld, Revisiting Tax Sub-
sidies for Cultural Institutions, 32 J Cultural Econ 275, 276 (2008); Michael Rushton, Who 
Pays? Who Benefits? Who Decides?, 32 J Cultural Econ 293, 295 (2008). 
 41 Komives, et al, Water, Electricity, and the Poor at *60–61 (cited in note 31). 
 42 See David Scott and Wayne Munson, Perceived Constraints to Park Usage among 
Individuals with Low Incomes, 12 J Park & Recreation Administration 79, 84, 91 (Winter 
1994); Jin-Hyung Lee, David Scott, and Myron F. Floyd, Structural Inequalities in Outdoor 
Recreation Participation: A Multiple Hierarchy Stratification Perspective, 33 J Leisure 
Rsrch 427, 443 (2001). For discussions of the sensitivity of lower-income people to usage 
fees, see Thomas More and Thomas Stevens, Do User Fees Exclude Low-Income People 
from Resource-Based Recreation?, 32 J Leisure Rsrch 341, 351–52 (2000); Stephen D. Reiling, 
Hsiang-Tai Cheng, and Cheryl Trott, Measuring the Discriminatory Impact Associated 
with Higher Recreational Fees, 14 Leisure Sci 121, 137 (1992); J. Bishop Grewell, The Eth-
ics of Recreation Fees: Slamming the Door on Low-Income People?, 22 PERC Rep 7, 8 (Mar 
2004), archived at http://perma.cc/FA6V-RG7E. 
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resources to pass the entry tests.43 Those unable to afford the im-
plicit eligibility fee are disproportionately handicapped. 
Here, the “open” and “free” attributes are technically correct 
(there is no ticket office at the gate of the park, nor a full tuition 
bill at the Chinese elite university). But it is functionally false. In 
deciding whether to pursue the freely accessed good, people face 
nonzero costs of arrival at the open gates or of qualifying for free 
entry, and these costs may vary across different groups both in 
magnitude and affordability. Sometimes these costs favor the 
poor. For example, the additional costs may be measured by time: 
how long the entrant is willing to stand in the queue. In such 
cases, free access is deployed more by those with low alternative 
cost of time, namely, the relatively poor.44 But other times these 
costs are stacked against the poor, especially when they require 
expenditure of disposable income. 
To be sure, part of an effective access justice policy may be 
the subsidization of the implicit nonprice fees. If, in order to enjoy 
open access to higher education, people have to spend years on 
costly preparation, prep schools can be subsidized. Ironically, this 
logic can also be turned on its head: implicit nonprice fees can be 
strategically mounted on some populations (primarily weak pop-
ulations) to reduce their access to the otherwise–free and open 
forum. Voter ID laws, which require a registration process that is 
relatively costless for the upper- and middle-class but costly for 
the poor, are a strategic impediment because of their particular 
effect on poor populations.45 
2. Network handicaps: Connectedness to a grid. 
Another form of pre-access impediment is membership in a 
network. To enjoy some forms of open access, people have to be 
 
 43 Keith Bradsher, In China, Families Bet It All on College for Their Children (NY 
Times, Feb 16, 2013), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/business/in-china 
-families-bet-it-all-on-a-child-in-college.html (visited Feb 12, 2016) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 44 See Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Neces-
sary Burdens 73–76 (Russell Sage 1992). 
 45 See Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 472 F3d 949, 955 (7th Cir 2007) 
(Evans dissenting) (arguing that the voter ID law in question would impact the ability of 
the poor and elderly to vote); Frank v Walker, 773 F3d 783, 785 (7th Cir 2014) (Posner 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), quoting Citizens without Proof: A Survey of 
Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification *2–3 
(Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Nov 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7NSF-5X4U (noting that the poor, the elderly, and minorities are less 
likely to have documents allowing them to comply with voter ID laws). 
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connected to the network through which the benefits are distrib-
uted. For example, to enjoy the many benefits from open services 
on the Internet one needs to be connected to the Internet. To enjoy 
“access to knowledge” one has to join a community of users that 
gain the access. At an even more basic level, immigrants may be 
deprived of access because they are not part of the language 
“network.” 
A painful reminder of the connectedness-to-a-network hand-
icap comes from an important access justice policy—projects 
providing people with subsidized utilities (like water and electric-
ity). In developing countries, utility subsidies benefitted least those 
who need them most—poor people in remote areas—because of the 
low rates of network connectedness among the very poor.46 If the 
electricity grid does not reach your village, cheap subsidized elec-
tricity is not going to benefit you. Likewise, the benefits of public 
roads and public transportation flow to communities connected by 
the commuter network, not to remote and unconnected areas. 
When connectedness to a network is the access handicap, ac-
cess justice would be better served by expanding the network, ra-
ther than subsidizing the goods and services that flow through it. 
Expenditures in expanding a network directly benefit new en-
trants who are brought in, who could be selected based on need. 
(Benefits also flow indirectly to incumbents in the network, due 
to “network externalities.”)47 By contrast, subsidies of the services 
flowing through the network benefit only the incumbents. 
3. Information handicap: Understanding the access 
privilege. 
Access may be deployed differentially because of information 
costs. People may be able to gain access without any implicit fee 
and without having to join a formal network or grid, but free ac-
cess may nevertheless be worthless to them if they don’t know 
about it or if they don’t understand why it might benefit them. 
The information about open access has to be disseminated to 
all potential beneficiaries. But people have different exposures to 
such information and different abilities to process it. I will show 
below examples of mandated health insurance benefits that are 
 
 46 See text accompanying notes 31–32. Another area in which connectedness to a 
network is key to access justice is Internet connection. See text accompanying notes 6 and 38. 
 47 For a brief description of network externalities, see David Bardey, Helmuth 
Cremer, and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common 
Network Externalities, 44 Rev Indust Org 327, 328 (2014). 
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available, and potentially beneficial, to all policyholders, but that 
are not utilized by some. To understand the ins and outs of a 
health insurance plan, the beneficiary needs to read lengthy and 
complex documents with numerous instructions about how to uti-
lize the different benefits. Lawmakers may make heroic efforts to 
simplify such guides and manuals, but the complex is often hard 
to simplify.48 And so some benefits may go unused, despite the 
access justice policy that brought them into the plans in the first 
place. 
Even educated people may succumb to information handi-
caps. Who can master every detail in her health and dental plan? 
Do you—sophisticated legal readers—know how often your vision 
plan entitles you to a new pair of glasses, and under what terms?49 
Later (in Part II), I will discuss in detail the mechanics of access 
to courts, an access justice policy that depends in part on people 
reading and responding to information and disclosures. For con-
sumers, access to courts is practiced through class actions, but 
joining the class litigation and receiving redress through it is con-
ditional on reading and understanding technical information no-
tices that most people tend to overlook.50 
While the complexity of access justice rules affects everybody, 
it is no surprise that it affects less educated and less sophisticated 
consumers more severely. Even if the structure of an access jus-
tice program is simplified, literacy, numeracy, and experience op-
erate as sorting devices, filtering out the less sophisticated.51 
True, access to education (through subsidized schooling) could po-
tentially help close the gaps in the information handicap between 
the rich and the poor. But, as I will illustrate below, some of the 
 
 48 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: 
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 121–37 (Princeton 2014). 
 49 See, for example, Benefits: Vision Plans (The University of Chicago Human Re-
sources, Jan 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T8CF-BEF8. 
 50 The information available suggests that the response rate is quite low. See Do 
Class Actions Benefit Class Members: An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions *2 (Mayer 
Brown LLP), archived at http://perma.cc/V5UX-KCM7 (stating that settlements delivered 
funds to between 0.000006 percent and 12 percent of class members). See also Debra Lyn 
Bassett, Class Action Silence, 94 BU L Rev 1781, 1796 (2014). 
 51 See Sean F. Reardon, Rachel A. Valentino, and Kenneth A. Shores, Patterns of 
Literacy among U.S. Students, 22 Future Children 17, 26 (Fall 2012), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/2LLU-ZJV7 (describing a large discrepancy in literacy rates based on income and 
noting that, for students born in 2000, those from families in the ninetieth percentile of 
income had literacy rates 1.25 standard deviations higher than those from families in the 
tenth percentile); Irwin S. Kirsch, et al, Adult Literacy in America: A First Look at the 
Findings of the National Adult Literacy Survey *60–61 (National Center for Education 
Statistics, Apr 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/6TR7-5W3N. 
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programs that intend to provide better access to information and 
education, and which are intended to reduce the information 
handicap, are themselves bootstrapped by this and other access 
handicaps—namely, by the fact that one needs to know about the 
availability of the access program, and be able to overcome other 
impediments to access.52 Worse still, some of these programs that 
purport to provide information equally and openly to all backfire 
and increase, rather than reduce, the inequality in access utiliza-
tion. If the information is more legible and useful to the educated, 
handing out such information may exacerbate the regressivity. 
For example, providing good disclosures about quality of hospitals 
may help sophisticated patients make better hospital choices, 
crowding out the less sophisticated and relegating them to lower-
quality medical care.53 
Closely related to the information problem is the cognitive 
function handicap. It is no secret that people sometimes make 
poor decisions because of cognitive biases and judgment error. 
Here, too, there is evidence that poor people perform worse and 
“behave in less capable ways.”54 People who experience ongoing 
material strain are more cognitively taxed and thus exhibit more 
mental scarcity, leading to decision errors.55 Access opportunities 
that require some measure of decisional sophistication to realize 
thus fall prey to the cognitive function handicap. 
4. Benefit handicaps: The differential value of access. 
Even if free or subsidized access is truly accessible to all, un-
obstructed by the cost, network, or information handicap, not every-
one will exercise it equally. Some people may derive more benefit 
 
 52 See notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Lawrence P. Casalino, et al, Will Pay-for-Performance and Quality Reporting 
Affect Health Care Disparities?, 26 Health Aff w405, w409 (2007), online at http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/3/w405.full.pdf (visited Aug 24, 2016) (Perma archive 
unavailable); Dana B. Mukamel, et al, Quality Report Cards, Selection of Cardiac Sur-
geons, and Racial Disparities: A Study of the Publication of the New York State Cardiac 
Surgery Reports, 41 Inquiry 435, 443–45 (2004); David Dranove, et al, Is More Information 
Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers, 111 J Polit Econ 555, 581–
83 (2003). 
 54 Anandi Mani, et al, Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 Sci 976, 976 (2013). 
See also generally Anuj K. Shah, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, Some Conse-
quences of Having Too Little, 338 Sci 682 (2012); Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, 
Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much (Times Books 2013). 
 55 See Justin S. White and William H. Dow, Intertemporal Choices for Health, in 
Christina A. Roberto and Ichiro Kawachi, eds, Behavioral Economics and Public Health 
27, 62 (Oxford 2016). 
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from the access justice program because they need it more. And 
conversely, others may need it less. 
Policies intended to improve physical access to facilities for 
people with disabilities are intended to have such differential ben-
efit and are rightly celebrated for these selective effects. In fact, 
they sometimes deliberately exclude others from deploying the ac-
cess program and even punish them if they do—for example, in 
the case of handicap parking spaces.56 
Many other facially neutral access justice policies suffer from 
varying utilization rates due to differential benefits across users. 
City parks with playgrounds are worth more to families with kids; 
open and subsidized higher education is worth more to people who 
graduate from high school; and accessible insurance is worth 
more to people with high losses. For example, programs of access 
to disaster relief (or to subsidized disaster insurance) benefit eve-
ryone who succumbs to an otherwise-uncompensated disaster, 
and in the abstract they appear neutral. But in effect these pro-
grams are more valuable to people who live in disaster-prone ar-
eas. All victims of severe weather disasters may qualify for some 
form of free government relief or subsidized flood insurance, but 
people living in the predicted paths of storms benefit more.57 
5. Affordability handicaps: The effect of small fees. 
Access justice is sometimes implemented through free-of-
charge entry. But problems of moral hazard may lead to ineffi-
cient deployment that would make the program too costly. When, 
for example, access to medicine is implemented by distribution of 
drugs free of any charge, people may hoard medications unneces-
sarily, at great cost to the providers and to taxpayers.58 Similarly, 
when people receive ambulance or emergency care services for 
 
 56 See, for example, 625 ILCS 5/11-1301.3 (mandating fines for those who, without 
authorization, park in spots reserved for persons with disabilities); Disabled Parking 
FAQ’s for Law Enforcement (Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JJ4A-N98W (stating that individual jurisdictions can issue tickets of $100 
to $300 for parking in a handicap space without a placard). 
 57 See Part I.D.3.a. See also generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, The Per-
verse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 Stan L Rev 571 (2016). 
 58 Consider Merrill Goozner, New Medicare Rule Aims to Curb Waste and Fraud in Med-
ical Equipment Business (Wash Post, Mar 24, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Z3V4-J3KL. 
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free, the services may be deployed excessively.59 This moral haz-
ard may occur in other areas as well. If, for example, enrollment 
in public universities is free of any tuition charge, people may en-
roll in programs of study even when they generate little probabil-
ity of private success and low social value.60 
The inefficiency and waste arising from such free-of-charge 
access justice programs often lead to the implementation of some 
cost sharing or co-payments—small fees that purport to shift a 
tolerable burden to those who make the decision to access the pro-
gram. The fees have to be large enough to reduce the moral haz-
ard, but not too large to make the program unaffordable. 
But even token prices may filter out many users, especially 
the poorest, for whom any minor cash price may be burdensome. 
This result has been abundantly documented in health care and 
prescription drug policy.61 The same result, of shutting down the 
very poor from gaining access, has also been suggested in the con-
text of rent control—a prominent access justice policy that seeks 
to improve access to housing among low-income renters and to 
promote mixed-income communities. Most rent control policies 
decrease but do not eliminate rent payments. Thus, the poorest 
renters may still be unable to afford the reduced rent payments. 
This prevents the program from having the desired effect on the 
target population. Although the distributive effects of rent control 
are debated and may vary across cities, a substantial literature 
has documented a disturbing distributive effect of rent control: 
the beneficiaries are often more sophisticated and economically 
stronger than the intended population.62 The regressive effects of 
 
 59 See Aaron L. Schwartz, et al, Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA 
Internal Med 1067, 1073 (2014) (finding that one-quarter of Medicare patients have re-
ceived unnecessary treatment that was likely to provide little benefit). 
 60 See Efficiency and Effectiveness of Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education in 
the EU *17–23 (European Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ4N-W6Q9. 
 61 See Michael Chernew, et al, Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on Socioeco-
nomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J Gen Internal Med 1131, 1134–35 (2008); Sujha 
Subramanian, Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer: Lessons for Med-
icaid Expansion under Health Reform, 49 Med Care 842, 844 (2011); Report to the Con-
gress: Medicare Payment Policy *338–66 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Mar 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3QKS-Y9YY. 
 62 See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J Econ Persp 99, 108 
(Winter 1995); Edward L. Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation? *9 (Harvard 
Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No 1985, Nov 1, 2002), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7RJW-6SJL. See also Joseph Gyourko and Peter Linneman, Equity and 
Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical Study of New York City, 26 J Urban Econ 
54, 64 (1989) (finding that lower-income residents benefitted at slightly higher levels, but 
that “poor benefit targeting” reduced this benefit). 
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some rent control policies may be due to more than the afforda-
bility handicap. They may be due to the information handicap—
some people are less competent at understanding how to jump the 
queue and secure the coveted scarce benefit. Or, even more cyni-
cally, they may be due to a variant of a network handicap—being 
outside a social or political network that helps secure the bene-
fit.63 But affordability may nevertheless explain some of the selec-
tion pattern. 
The affordability handicap can be found elsewhere. For ex-
ample, it may be a concern in consumer-protection law.64 Laws 
mandating consumer rights—whether these are access rights or 
other universal nondisclaimable protections—can have price ef-
fects that are negligible for some but meaningful for others. If 
people have different price-quality tradeoffs, the higher quality 
obtained by mandated rights may price out the bargain basement 
shoppers who prefer low-quality, low-price bundles. 
These patterns explain the access handicap. While providing 
some order to the universe of access justice policies and generat-
ing some testable predictions regarding the prevalence of the re-
gressive effect, my account above falls short of a “theory” of differ-
ential access. The argument that access policies may be regressive 
follows inductive reasoning, rather than first-principles logic. Its 
force depends on the prevalence of evidence supporting it. For ex-
ample, access to government disaster relief may be progressive if 
it goes to low-income victims (as is often the case with tornados 
destroying mobile homes in Tornado Alley or in low-lying areas 
along the Mississippi River), but it may be regressive if it goes to 
higher-income victims (as is often the case with hurricanes dam-
aging high-end waterfront property). There is nothing inherent in 
the type of relief that determines its regressive consequences. Its 
redistributive bottom line depends on the relative incidence of 
storms in poor and rich areas. In general, then, the various access 
justice policies create different sets of winners and losers. As the 
 
 63 See, for example, Jim Edwards, No, Rent Control Does Not Work–It Actually Ben-
efits the Rich and Hurts the Poor (Business Insider, Sept 3, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6T4C-AFXZ (describing how personal connections can be crucial to a buyer 
seeking a rent-controlled apartment); Scott James, How Rent Control Subsidizes San 
Francisco’s Super-Rich (Bay Citizen, Feb 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/37YB 
-XTNV (describing how tenants’ political clout helps to cement San Francisco’s rent control 
policies). 
 64 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: 
A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 Common Mkt L Rev 109, 113–15 (2013). 
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factors just described in this Section come into play, the winners 
are less likely to be drawn from the poor. 
D. Regressive Legal Institutions 
We have seen that access justice programs may be regressive 
when their benefits accrue disproportionately to sophisticated or 
affluent groups. The examples drawn out thus far focused on fis-
cal and budgetary allocations, whereby the government uses its 
funding powers to allocate benefits. This Section moves on to ex-
amine a different type of access justice intervention—accom-
plished through legal institutions and mandates. These are poli-
cies in which the government does not directly produce a public 
good (as, say, in the examples of parks and education). Instead, 
the distributive effects of the policies discussed below occur indi-
rectly, through the costs and benefits arising from legal rules. 
1. Mandated disclosure. 
Mandated disclosure is a regulatory technique requiring one 
party to the transaction to provide information to the other party 
so that the other party can make a better decision. It does not 
regulate the decisions or the choices that people make; it regu-
lates only the distribution of information. Mandated disclosure is 
an access-to-information policy that requires truthful, often com-
prehensive, information to be served out in equal portions. All 
consumers get the same warnings, the same disclosure forms, and 
the same data to fuel their informed consent.65 
Mandated disclosure is broadly intended to protect weaker 
populations. Disclosures are routinely enacted in response to 
trouble stories in which ordinary citizens suffered misfortune. 
Lawmakers often brandish the specific travails of a working class 
or low-income person to punctuate the utility of the proposed 
disclosure mandate for similar folks who are not sophisticated or 
fortunate enough to obtain the necessary information absent a 
mandate.66 
But free and equal access to information does not mean equal 
utilization of it. Building on the conceptual framework developed 
above, it is the information handicap that limits the use of man-
dated disclosures. Anatole France remarked bitingly about “the 
 
 65 See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know at 3–6 (cited in 
note 48). 
 66 See id at 138–43. 
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majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to 
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their 
bread.”67 The majestic equality of disclosure fades when filtered 
through the information handicap. The information being dis-
closed has to be sought, noticed, read, understood, processed, and 
then used in a way that improves decisions and outcomes. In each 
one of these steps, the poor and poorly educated benefit less than 
the wealthy and the educated. The very people whose troubles led 
to the enactment of disclosure mandates are least likely to benefit 
from them. 
Medical informed consent forms—one of the crown jewels of 
the mandated disclosure paradigm—illustrate this pattern. Con-
sent forms are required by law to be fully detailed, so that all risks 
posed to patients or to human research subjects will be transpar-
ent. Even if drafted in lay language, these forms are complex, 
mostly written at a literacy level exceeding that of poor and unso-
phisticated patients.68 
Similarly, consumer financial disclosures require some finan-
cial education and savvy to be useful. “Evidence from studies of 
consumer credit disclosure rules suggests that it is better-off con-
sumers who tend to make use of information.”69 “The poor may 
rationally decide not to make use of information, if they feel no 
alternatives will be available to them.”70 Better-educated (and 
wealthier) consumers know better how to search for information, 
understand it, ask questions about it, comparison shop, and re-
ceive better advice with it.71 
 
 67 Anatole France, The Red Lily 95 (John Lane 5th ed 1916) (Winifred Stephens, 
trans) (Frederic Chapman, ed). 
 68 See S. Michael Sharp, Consent Documents for Oncology Trials: Does Anybody Read 
These Things?, 27 Am J Clinical Oncology 570, 570 (2004) (“[S]tudies have found that con-
sent documents are long and complicated to the point that the average person in the 
United States is likely to find them difficult to read.”); Angela Fagerlin, et al, Patient Ed-
ucation Materials about the Treatment of Early-Stage Prostate Cancer: A Critical Review, 
140 Annals Internal Med 721, 726–27 (2004); Stuart A. Grossman, Steven Piantadosi, and 
Charles Covahey, Are Informed Consent Forms That Describe Clinical Oncology Research 
Protocols Readable by Most Patients and Their Families?, 12 J Clinical Oncology 2211, 
2212 (1994). 
 69 Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Infor-
mation, 32 J L & Society 349, 357 (2005). 
 70 Id at 358. See also William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in 
Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis L Rev 400, 443–44 (“[I]f too much information is put on 
the label, it will look like the fine print in a contract and undoubtedly be ignored by most 
consumers.”). 
 71 See Barbara O’Neill, Barbara Bristow, and Patricia Q. Brennan, MONEY 2000 
Participants: Who Are They?, 37 J Extension (Feb 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/28D4 
-UWLF; Howells, 32 J L & Society at 357–58 (cited in note 69). 
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Mandated disclosures not only benefit the more educated and 
more sophisticated recipients, but, in an unintended way, can 
worsen the relative situation of weaker groups.72 There are some 
disturbing instances in which this phenomenon has been empiri-
cally documented. For example, hospitals must disclose report 
cards—scores that measure the quality of treatment they provide, 
most often mortality rates. There is some evidence that these 
mandates led hospitals to improve the reported dimensions, but 
there are also discouraging findings that the disclosure hurt the 
sicker and poorer patients. Healthier and more sophisticated pa-
tients found their way to higher-rated hospitals and to better 
overall medical care, while sicker and poorer patients were 
treated in hospitals with worse grades. This results in “marginal 
health benefits for healthy patients, and major adverse health 
consequences for sicker patients.”73 The potential harm to poorer, 
sicker patients is due to their relative disadvantage in the “arms 
race” to obtain the benefits of superior medicine that disclosures 
reveal. If the best hospitals have limited capacity, those with 
handicapped access to the information about hospital quality will 
suffer a systematic disadvantage in medical outcomes. 
Mandated disclosure can be harmful to the poor in another, 
subtler way. In consumer credit markets, the poor face shadier 
lending practices, have less financial savvy, and are more vulner-
able to marketing traps. The main protection they have is the net-
work of antifraud regulations disciplining the conduct of sub-
prime lenders.74 These are state and federal laws that identify 
particular patterns of deception and abuse and provide remedies 
for the abused parties. Disclosures, however, undermine these 
protections. Why? Because compliance with disclosure mandates 
creates a veneer of legality, a presumption against fraud. Almost 
by definition, there cannot be fraud or deception when the lender 
made all the information accessible and carefully lavished on the 
 
 72 See Kenneth McNeil, et al, Market Discrimination against the Poor and the Impact 
of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 L & Society Rev 695, 699 (1979); 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know at 176–80 (cited in note 48). 
 73 Dranove, et al, 111 J Polit Econ at 577 (cited in note 53). 
 74 Paul M. Schwartz, Note, Where Do We Go from Here? The Battle against Predatory 
Subprime Lending, 3 Brooklyn J Corp, Fin & Comm L 213, 231 (2008) (discussing the state 
and federal remedies for victims of predatory lending). 
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debtor all the mandated disclosures required by the Truth in 
Lending Act75 and its satellites.76 
And so, access justice—here, the alluring ideal of equal access 
to information—replaces and substitutes for the fraud claim a 
ruffled consumer would otherwise have. The protection that 
would otherwise be accorded through antifraud legislation is thus 
diminished. Sophisticated consumers are less troubled by this 
substitution effect because they are not confronted with the same 
predatory lending schemes. They are better educated and better 
advised, they can sniff the aroma of deception, and they can safe-
guard against questionable solicitations by asking better ques-
tions or taking their patronage elsewhere. They can fall back on 
more robust informal networks of advice and reputation. It is 
therefore the poor who suffer disproportionately from the crip-
pling of antifraud and antideception laws. 
2. Mandated compensation. 
Tort and products liability, and other remedial rules in pri-
vate law, guarantee people’s access to remedy—an equal right to 
all victims to be made “whole” according to the same formula. This 
is a crucial ingredient in some conceptions of access justice be-
cause meaningful redress of injuries protects either those who are 
“excluded from the market or [ ] those who face difficulties in 
making use of the market freedoms.”77 But, like many minimum-
quality terms, mandated compensation can have differential ef-
fects across consumers, which can lead to cross-subsidies 
whereby poor consumers subsidize the compensation of wealth-
ier consumers.78 
Mandated compensation can fail to generate protective bene-
fits to weak consumers because of the utility handicap and the 
affordability handicap. Consider first the utility handicap. Tort 
 
 75 Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1601 et seq. 
 76 See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure 
of e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in Omri Ben-Shahar, ed, Boilerplate: The Foundation of 
Market Contracts 83, 92–93 (Cambridge 2007); Riensche v Cingular Wireless LLC, 2006 
WL 3827477, *6–9 (WD Wash); Williams v First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp, 
225 F3d 738, 751–52 (DC Cir 2000) (affirming the denial of the plaintiff’s Truth in Lending 
Act claim given the lender’s adequate disclosure of the agreement’s terms). 
 77 Hans-W. Micklitz, Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law *2 (European 
University Institute Working Paper No LAW 2011/02, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
M4TD-MAZU. 
 78 Charles Fried and David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should Be Done and 
Who Should Do It 71 (AEI 2003). 
 2016] The Paradox of Access Justice 1783 
 
compensation for injuries arising from defective products requires 
manufacturers to pay for the losses suffered by victims. The cost 
of this liability regime is spread to all consumers through the in-
creased price of products. How much each victim gets in compen-
sation depends on how large her losses are, and—not surpris-
ingly—the measurable losses to the poor tend to be smaller than 
those that accrue to the wealthy. Property-rich and high-income 
consumers receive greater awards, because damages in tort law 
are correlated with lost income and with consequential harm to 
property.79 
If, hypothetically, these property-rich and high-income con-
sumers had to buy private insurance for their idiosyncratic losses, 
they would be charged premiums commensurate with their 
higher expected losses, and the cross-subsidy would be avoided. 
This is the most basic feature of private insurance markets: if you 
insure against larger losses—for example, when the insured asset 
is a more valuable home or a larger earning capacity—you pay 
more for the coverage. But products liability law bundles the in-
surance component with the product purchase and the product 
price, preventing differentiation of the premiums. In most retail 
circumstances, sellers lack the ability to discriminate ex ante in 
price between different groups of consumers according to charac-
teristics such as wealth or propensity toward getting into acci-
dents (although for some products, like high- or low-end automo-
biles, some separation occurs because these products are 
targeting different income niches). As a result, all customers end 
up paying an equal implicit premium for the right to get the bun-
dled insurance coverage—in the form of a higher product price. 
Poorer consumers with smaller expected losses thus cross-subsidize 
the broader de facto coverage of wealthier consumers engaging in 
the same activity or consuming the same product.80 
 
 79 This point has been made previously by many writers. See, for example, Richard 
L. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 Brit J L & Society 199, 202–03 (1981) (noting 
that “the quantum of damages preserves, and indeed amplifies, the present unequal dis-
tribution of wealth and income”); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product War-
ranty, 90 Yale L J 1297, 1350–51 (1981); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L J 1521, 1546, 1559–60 (1987); Alan Schwartz, Proposals 
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L J 353, 405–06 (1988); 
Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety: A Rejoinder, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 
689, 690 (1974); James R. Garven, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability, 
28 J Insurance Issues 1, 6 (2005). 
 80 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1546, 1559–60 (cited in note 79); James Henderson, 
Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 Touro L Rev 107, 119 
(1993) (emphasizing that tort liability “is a miserable flop as a social insurance system”). 
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Despite my optimism regarding unbundled insurance mar-
kets, a similar pattern of cross-subsidization can occur when man-
dated compensation schemes are infused into insurance law. For 
example, auto insurance is widely viewed as a scheme intended 
to guarantee a cushion of compensation to victims of auto acci-
dents.81 Higher policy limits cost more, but provide more recovery 
for all victims. Drivers may not wish to purchase high liability 
limits, but the law requires them to do so in order to accord access 
to compensation to their victims. But who, among the potential 
victims, benefits more from drivers’ generous insurance? Interest-
ingly, advocates for low-income minority groups argued against 
mandatory make-whole auto insurance policies.82 They realized 
that when the injured plaintiffs are poor, their recoveries are 
smaller. This is because their lost wages are lower, lawyers are 
harder for them to find, and jurors are less likely to return high 
awards. Thus, in the grand scheme, poorer populations benefit 
less from high-limit auto insurance, but nevertheless pay the 
same premiums to drive. Accordingly, their advocates even went 
as far as aligning with insurers in proposing low-cost, no-frills 
auto insurance policy options designed for low-income drivers. 
Those choices would have allowed people to opt out of the general 
pool and establish a separate insurance pool, with lower premi-
ums. Partitioned from the general pool (and its associated higher 
coverage benefits), they would cease to cross-subsidize their more 
affluent fellow drivers and victims. Ironically, consumer activists 
like Ralph Nader successfully campaigned against the partitioned 
two-tier choice, invoking the logic and the rhetoric of access jus-
tice. Nader alleged that the low-coverage option “would unfairly 
deprive the poor of their right to be fully compensated for pain 
and suffering” and that it “dehumanized the poor and deprived 
them of their equal rights.”83 
 
 81 See, for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, The Liability Century: Insurance and Tort 
Law from the Progressive Era to 9/11 70–72 (Harvard 2008); Shauhin Talesh, Insurance 
Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC Irvine L Rev 985, 996–97 (2012) (“[M]andatory automo-
bile insurance laws serve the public interest by making drivers financially responsible to 
others they injure in an accident and are now treated as a necessary cost of living in the 
United States.”). 
 82 James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, and Stephen J. Carroll, The U.S. Experience 
with No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Retrospective 52–53 (RAND 2010) (recounting the 
efforts of these advocates). 
 83 Id at 53–54. See also Kenneth Reich, Nader Draws Criticism by Consumers for No-
Fault View (LA Times, May 28, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/7PC5-7CXM. 
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These examples point to the utility handicap as the source of 
the regressive distribution effect of mandated compensation poli-
cies—different groups gaining different value from the benefit. 
But the affordability handicap may also account for the differen-
tial value. For some low-income consumers, the price increase of 
the product that now contains a more generous remedy or insur-
ance component might make the entire activity—the purchase of 
the product or the driving of a car—prohibitively costly. They exit 
the market and no longer cross-subsidize their more affluent fel-
low consumers. But the adverse effect on them is no less trou-
bling. It is the denial of an even more important access—the equal 
access to product markets and the participation in the primary 
activity.84 
3. Mandated insurance. 
The auto accidents and products liability examples above il-
lustrate a more general phenomenon of mandatory equal access 
to insurance: elites benefit more from indemnity, even though it 
is equally available to all. A similar pattern can be traced in other 
insurance schemes, in which the social policy of access justice is 
driven by egalitarian concerns but in fact embodies a regressive 
redistribution. Let me demonstrate it through two examples: 
property insurance and health insurance. 
a) Property insurance.  Consider the widely prevalent public 
programs providing access to affordable homeowner’s insurance in 
areas exposed to severe weather. The high risk of storms and of 
catastrophic loss means high, sometimes unaffordable, premiums. 
Political pressure thus builds for government intervention that 
would make insurance and home ownership accessible to middle- 
and lower-income people. Subsidized insurance is viewed as an im-
portant ingredient in access justice because insurance is required 
to obtain a mortgage loan, and its affordability can determine the 
path to home ownership. This is why flood insurance, for example, 
is provided with significant subsidies by the federal government 
 
 84 For similar arguments on compensation in contract law and the redistributive ef-
fect of consequential damages, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, 
and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 659–60 (1988) (discussing how, 
when a single price is charged, “buyers who had inherently low risks would be paying a 
premium to cover the potential liability to buyers who had inherently high risks”); Gwyn 
D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S Cal L Rev 1125, 1129–
32 (1988). 
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through the National Flood Insurance Program.85 This is also why 
many states that experience severe weather, like Florida, set reg-
ulatory caps on premiums for homeowner’s insurance, and why 
some have state-funded insurance companies whose public pur-
pose is to “provide property insurance protection . . . to those who 
are, in good faith, entitled to obtain coverage through the private 
market but are unable to do so.”86 
This is the rhetoric of access justice. When establishing such 
programs and voting to fund them, the ideal of access justice en-
genders bipartisan support, justified by “our moral duty to the 
poorest people and working people and lower middle income peo-
ple.”87 Billions of dollars of subsidies are justified, according to one 
lawmaker, to prevent working families, who are “doing every-
thing they can to put food on the table,” from losing their homes.88 
But the reality, despite this progressive rhetoric, is disappoint-
ingly regressive, and largely due to the problem that I classified 
as the utility handicap. The government subsidies for insurance 
accrue foremost to homeowners in the highest-risk areas—in 
coastal communities. These are also the higher-value properties, 
owned by the affluent who desire and who can afford the luxury 
of proximity to the beach.89 Because the deficit between premiums 
and payouts has to be paid by all taxpayers (or all policyholders, 
including those located inland in lower-risk, lower-value, lower-
income areas), the subsidized insurance benefits the wealthier 
households at the expense of others. 
In a separate coauthored study, I estimated the regressive 
effect of Florida’s state-subsidized property insurance program. 
The study found a strong positive correlation between wealth and 
 
 85 See, for example, Flood Insurance: FEMA’s Rate-Setting Process Warrants Atten-
tion *6–7 (GAO, Oct 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/GT46-PLGV (“Congress mandated 
the use of subsidized premiums to encourage communities to join the program and miti-
gate concerns that charging rates that fully and accurately reflected flood risk would be a 
burden to some property owners.”). 
 86 Who We Are (Citizens Property Insurance Corporation), archived at http:// 
perma.cc”/F7QH-74H2. 
 87 National Flood Insurance Program Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005, 
HR 3669, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec 19751 (Sept 8, 2005) (statement of Rep 
Frank). See also Rick Lazio, Flood Fund Aids Working-Class Homeowners (NY Times, Nov 
18, 1993), online at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/18/opinion/l-flood-fund-aids-working 
-class-homeowners-535993.html (visited Aug 24, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 88 Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, S 1926, 113th Cong, 2d 
Sess, in 160 Cong Rec S 581 (daily ed Jan 29, 2014) (statement of Sen Heitkamp). 
 89 See Value of Properties in the National Flood Insurance Program *2 (Congres-
sional Budget Office, June 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/AVG4-5XDP (noting the ex-
tremely high values of subsidized coastal properties). 
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insurance subsidy. It turns out that a 1 percent increase in a 
household’s value is associated with roughly a 1 percent increase 
in the subsidy. Simply put, if Eve’s home is worth twice as much 
as Adam’s, Eve enjoys on average twice the absolute subsidy—$2 
for every $1 that Adam gets.90 
While my main concern in discussing this example of subsi-
dized property insurance is to show the unintended redistributive 
effect of access justice, this is the moment in the Article when I 
digress and make a comment on social waste. The cross-subsidy 
that government-provided insurance creates not only redistrib-
utes resources in favor of the affluent coastal residents and at the 
expense of others, but also energizes the rapid development along 
the riskiest, most erosion-prone, coastal areas.91 In a little less 
than two generations, the population living in coastal Florida in-
creased fourfold, by ten million people. Coastal exposure now rep-
resents 79 percent of all property exposure in the state, with an 
insured value of $2.9 trillion.92 You’d think that frequent hurri-
canes would chill the rate of development, right? Not in the slight-
est (why should they, if insurance is filthy cheap?). The path that 
Hurricane Andrew blazed along the Florida coast in 1992, at the 
time leaving $25 billion in losses, has been so lushly redeveloped 
that the same storm would now cause more than double the 
losses, estimated by a congressional report at $55 billion in 2005 
(holding constant the value of building material and real estate, 
as well as other societal changes).93 Access justice, in this case, 
was in large part an invitation to more affluent Americans to 
move to the land of subsidy. 
b) Health insurance.  In the homeowner’s insurance exam-
ple (and previously in the discussion of auto insurance), the elite 
had larger losses and thus received more de facto coverage for the 
same subsidized price. But the access handicap of insurance can 
accrue for a different reason: the lower propensity to invoke the 
benefits. This effect could occur in the area of health insurance. 
Poor people are more sensitive to co-payments (affordability 
handicap) and to other nonprice fees (cost handicap) and thus can 
less easily access the treatment benefits that the wealthy more 
 
 90 See Ben-Shahar and Logue, 68 Stan L Rev at 606–07 (cited in note 57). 
 91 Id at 613. 
 92 Florida Hurricane Insurance: Fact File (Insurance Information Institute, Oct 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WVB9-XAUP. 
 93 Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades 
Are Potentially Significant *25 (GAO, Mar 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/ZA9N-MM5V. 
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readily secure.94 Further, as health plans and medical bureaucra-
cies become more complex, it is the sophisticates that can better 
understand and utilize the labyrinth of insurance benefits (infor-
mation handicap).95 Indeed, much regulatory effort has been fo-
cused on “health insurance literacy” and on simplifying the “Sum-
mary of Coverage” forms that enrollees receive, to afford greater 
accessibility to the less educated. But the results are disappoint-
ing. People have difficulty ascertaining what is covered, what it 
costs, and which plans to choose.96 As a result, rates of health care 
utilization vary, and insurance benefits realization falls short of 
plan treatment eligibility. If there are disproportionate rates of 
utilization of benefits among people with different wealth and so-
phistication, health insurance can quickly become regressive in 
the strong sense, as long as the disproportionate utilization out-
weighs the higher premiums that the high earners pay. 
This regressive effect—a wealth transfer from those with less 
means to the more affluent—has been documented, for example, 
in the area of mental health insurance. One of the access justice 
trends promoted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act97 is to mandate mental health benefits as part of all health 
plans.98 But studies found that, when mental health benefits are 
covered, whites and high-income individuals consume more ser-
vices than nonwhites and low-income individuals.99 Nonwhites 
and low-income individuals do not take advantage of these bene-
fits at the same rates as their white and more affluent coworkers, 
and to the degree that nonwhites and low-income individuals seek 
care for mental illnesses, they are more likely to turn to general 
 
 94 See Joseph Newhouse, et al, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment 57–58 (Harvard 1993) (discussing whether cost sharing had a larger effect 
among the poor). 
 95 See M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 Yale J Health 
Pol, L & Ethics 95, 108 (2001). 
 96 See Lynn Quincy, Making Health Insurance Cost-Sharing Clear to Consumers: 
Challenges in Implementing Health Reform’s Insurance Disclosure Requirements *4–6 
(Commonwealth Fund, Feb 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/G7TU-6P4J. 
 97 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010), codified in various sections of Title 42. 
 98 See Health Benefits & Coverage: Mental Health & Substance Abuse Coverage (US 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), archived at http://perma.cc/MA9E-MTSW. 
 99 See, for example, Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those 
They Are Designed to Help?, 26 Health Aff 1345, 1351 (2007). 
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practitioners rather than to mental health professionals. For ex-
ample, it was found that whites take advantage of outpatient 
mental health benefits about four times more often than blacks.100 
If these findings can be generalized—if mental health insur-
ance benefits are deployed by the elites more—these benefits con-
stitute transfers from nonwhites to whites and from low-income 
to high-income workers. The mandates provide access to mental 
health care to all, and they are commonly supported by the rhet-
oric of access for the weaker, otherwise-undertreated, groups. But 
because insurance premiums under group health plans can only 
imperfectly separate the pool, and thus cannot reflect the utiliza-
tion by heavy users, everyone pays for services that are dispro-
portionately consumed by the elite. 
Again, it is worth refreshing a point made earlier.101 It might 
not be troubling or even surprising that some individual compo-
nents in a large multifaceted scheme are favoring the affluent. 
Surely, some other components can more than offset this effect by 
redistributing in favor of other groups. It is the net effect of the 
program overall that matters, not its individual benefits. The re-
gressive impact of specific features is troubling only to the extent 
that it is both unintended and not accounted for in the overall 
calculus. If a feature of the insurance program is thought to be 
progressive, and if political capital is spent in passing it to favor 
the poor, it might then be more problematic to discover that its 
effects run counter to establishment wisdom. 
4. Mandated accommodations. 
In general, laws mandating access for people with disabilities 
have an important effect that goes beyond income redistribution. 
Enabling disabled people to access public areas, buildings, and 
transportation allows them fuller participation in society, and 
serves the goal of “equal access to societal opportunities.”102 For 
 
 100 See id at 1349. In a further study, Professor Barak Richman and his coauthors 
demonstrated that the greater use of mental health treatments among whites and high-
income patients is not explained by greater incidence of mental illness. Strikingly, there 
is no significant evidence that higher incidence of outpatient mental health care reduces 
the likelihood of adverse mental health (measured by the probability of hospitalization for 
mental illness). See Barak Richman, et al, Mental Health Care Consumption and Out-
comes: Considering Preventative Strategies across Race and Class *8, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/ED36-F5NL. 
 101 See text accompanying note 25. 
 102 Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics 
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va L Rev 825, 860 (2003). See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
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example, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973103 forbids organi-
zations and employers from excluding individuals with disabili-
ties or denying them an equal opportunity to receive program ben-
efits and services. It is aimed to “guarantee [ ] equal opportunity” 
and “equal access” for people with disabilities.104 
But, in a subtle manner, disability accommodations could be 
regressive within the eligible class, when they disproportionately 
benefit the elite among those entitled to the accommodation. Con-
sider the following example. Under the above-mentioned § 504, 
public school students with disabilities are entitled to accommo-
dations such as additional time on exams and assignments. There 
is now growing evidence that in reality students from affluent areas 
are far more likely to enjoy these accommodations than are students 
from poor areas. A survey by the US Department of Education’s 
Civil Rights Data Collection shows that students in wealthy dis-
tricts have nearly five times more utilization of the accommoda-
tions, relative to the state average. In Illinois, only about 1 per-
cent of public school students statewide had § 504 
accommodations, compared to 5 percent in Chicago’s wealthy sub-
urbs. The twenty districts with the highest percentages of accom-
modations had 76 percent white enrollments and all had lower 
percentages of poverty than the state average, while the twenty 
districts with the lowest accommodation rate were only 19 percent 
white and had far higher poverty rates than the state average.105 
Section 504 was designed to level the playing field for people 
with disabilities, and in a broad range of areas does so effectively. 
But some of its privileges are not simple or cheap to invoke, thus 
setting off an unintended sorting dynamic, resulting in selective 
access. First, the information handicap: some measure of sophis-
tication is necessary to know about the available accommoda-
tions, how to apply for them, how to be tested, and who pays for 
 
Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 Va L Rev 397, 426–30 (2000); US Airways, 
Inc v Barnett, 535 US 391, 397 (2002) (noting that “basic equal opportunity” was the goal 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 103 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq. 
 104 29 USC § 701(b)(1)(F), (c)(2). 
 105 Diane Rado, Special Help Starts as Early as Grade School—but Only for Select 
Students (Chicago Tribune, June 6, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4BGQ-N4LP. For 
the full data, see New Data from U.S. Department of Education Highlights Educational 
Inequities around Teacher Experience, Discipline and High School Rigor (US Department 
of Education, Mar 6, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/A7US-PSLC. 
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the tests.106 Second, the cost handicap: exam accommodations re-
quire the qualifying student to be diagnosed as having a learning 
disability.107 These diagnostics are expensive and require both fi-
nancial investment and motivation. And so, like the remote vaca-
tion parks that are difficult to reach, equal access is an illusion. 
Finally, there is the network handicap: pragmatically, families in 
social networks that know about and discuss the practice of chil-
dren’s exam preparations and accommodation diagnostics are 
more likely to seek the accommodation.108 
The same problem has been documented, for example, with 
college admissions. Texas’s “Top 10 Percent Plan,” an access jus-
tice program that provides automatic admission to all state uni-
versities for students in the top 10 percent of their high school 
classes, has been shown to benefit poor communities less than ex-
pected: “Where there isn’t a strong college-going culture . . . we 
don’t find evidence that eligibility for the top 10 percent has an 
impact on students going to the flagship [university].”109 With dif-
ferential propensities to invoke the accommodation, the gap be-
tween the sophisticated and the poor reemerges, and the accom-
modations end up being deployed by high-income and elite 
groups. 
Neither exam accommodations nor selective enrollment to 
colleges are transfers from the poor to the wealthy. Exam accom-
modations granted to disabled students in wealthy suburbs do not 
come at the expense of disabled students in poor districts, because 
all can qualify. Instead, the advantages of exam accommodations 
 
 106 See Office of Diverse Learner Supports and Services (Chicago Public Schools, Nov 
18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HWJ2-WQ79 (discussing the process of applying for 
accommodations); Special Education (Davis Joint Unified School District), online at 
http://www.djusd.k12.ca.us/speced (visited Mar 20, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(stating that anyone can request an evaluation in writing). 
 107 See Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the 
Legal Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities 47–48 (Harvard 1997) (discussing 
the complex process of identifying a learning disorder). 
 108 See Jake Tapper, Dan Morris, and Lara Setrakian, Does Loophole Give Rich Kids 
More Time on SAT? (ABC News, Mar 30, 2006), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/ 
loophole-give-rich-kids-time-sat/story?id=1787712 (visited Mar 20, 2016) (Perma archive 
unavailable) (describing how some wealthy students employ money and social connections 
to get diagnoses that grant them extra time on standardized tests). 
 109 Laura Isensee, New Research Finds Top 10 Percent Plan Impacts Students Differ-
ently (Houston Public Media, Apr 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PU94-J588. See 
also Lindsay Daugherty, Paco Martorell, and Isaac McFarlin Jr, Percent Plans, Automatic 
Admissions, and College Outcomes *27 (IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/8EXB-93FV. 
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come largely at the expense of nondisabled students (and dispro-
portionately those from wealthy suburbs). Similarly, automatic 
acceptance to colleges for the top 10 percent comes again at the 
expense of those who would otherwise be admitted, mostly strong 
students. But as long as the access policies serve affluent popula-
tions and not the poor, the relative opportunities of the affluent 
increase. The difficulties attributed to learning disabilities or to 
lack of elite college education then continue to be concentrated 
more among the poor who do not deploy the opportunities for im-
provement, contributing to their relative deprivation. 
5. Preservation of open space. 
In recent decades, numerous states and local communities 
enacted land preservation acts, authorizing special taxes and 
budgetary allocations to purchase and convert private land for 
public purposes. As access justice policies, their purpose is to pro-
tect “open space,” “affordable housing,” and historical preserva-
tion, and to counteract private forces of commercial development, 
selective access, and excessive growth.110 “Equitable access to 
open, green spaces is vital to the environmental, social, and eco-
nomic life of a community. . . . [C]hildren are better able to learn 
and people are happier and healthier when they have access to 
natural settings.”111 The Trust for Public Land champions such 
efforts as “protect[ing] land for people” and ensuring “easy access 
to a safe place to play in nature.”112 
For example, the Massachusetts Community Preservation 
Act113 (CPA) was passed in 2000, allowing cities and towns to 
adopt a CPA program by imposing property tax surcharges of up 
to 3 percent, thus becoming eligible for matching funds from the 
state, bankrolled by fees imposed on all deed registry transac-
tions.114 Who benefits from this program? Who pays for it? 
Not surprisingly, affluent towns are the biggest winners. It 
was estimated that “communities in the highest quintile for prop-
erty values received $127 per capita in CPA matching funds, 
 
 110 Christopher Hawkins, Electoral Support for Community Growth Management Pol-
icy, 92 Soc Sci Q 268, 282 (2011). For an example of one such act, see Community Preser-
vation Act § 2, 2000 Mass Acts 1234, codified as amended at Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, § 2. 
 111 Veda Truesdale, Open Space Access: Passive Recreation, Pocket Parks, Greenways/ 
Blueways (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Sept 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/65TT-BE36. 
 112 Our Work (Trust for Public Land), archived at http://perma.cc/9V74-PWQV. 
 113 2000 Mass Act 1234, codified as amended at Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, § 1 et seq. 
 114 Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, §§ 3(b), 9. 
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while . . . [those] in the lowest three quintiles received $10, $5, 
and $3 per capita respectively.”115 “A large share of the state funds 
is going to a few communities with high property values.”116 The 
median income among the top ten winners—communities that re-
ceived the largest state-funded subsidy—was about $87,000, 
while the median income within the top losers—those who pay to 
fund the subsidy but do not enjoy it—was only about $38,000.117 
Even in the winning communities, the bulk of the state funding 
is spent not on affordable housing (which would have been pro-
gressive), but on open space protection.118 
Why do affluent municipalities receive the bulk of the bene-
fit? In short: due to the affordability handicap. Adoption of the 3 
percent property tax surcharge, which is required to qualify for 
the state subsidy, is correlated with high property value.119 Low-
income communities are reluctant to vote for tax increases, and 
stay out. 
Even more disturbingly, while lower-income cities refrain 
from tapping into the CPA subsidy spigot, they nevertheless pay 
more than their share to fund its costs. Under the Massachusetts 
law, the subsidy is paid for through lump sum fees imposed on all 
real estate transactions, statewide.120 This means that larger cit-
ies, where most of the transactions occur, are the big contributors. 
But larger cities are also concentrations of low-income residents 
and low property values, where CPA referenda rarely pass. Thus, 
“the residents of poor communities that could not afford a land 
bank would end up subsidizing, through their state taxes, 
wealthy communities that might have afforded a land bank on 
their own.”121 When all is said and done, in the name of access 
justice, resources are transferred from residents of the poorer cit-
ies to the wealthy communities. Weston, Newton, and Nantucket 
win. Worcester loses. 
Open space preservation policies are regressive in another in-
direct way. Reducing the supply of land for development increases 
 
 115 Robin Sherman and David Luberoff, The Massachusetts Community Preservation 
Act: Who Benefits, Who Pays? *11 (Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, July 2007), 
archived at http://perma.cc/D6AH-7T5C. 
 116 Id at *13. 
 117 Id at *16. 
 118 Id at *17. 
 119 Sherman and Luberoff, The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act at *20 
(cited in note 115). 
 120 See Mass Ann Laws ch 44B, §§ 8–9. 
 121 Community Preservation, Boston Globe A22 (Nov 3, 1999). 
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housing prices, crowding out the poor.122 Labeled by one report as 
“the new segregation,” restricted growth policies “deter African-
American and other minorities from the housing market [at] dis-
proportionate rates.”123 The city of Portland, Oregon, with its ag-
gressive land preservation and urban growth boundary rules and 
rapidly climbing housing costs,124 is a testament to this causal 
effect.125 
II.  ACCESS TO COURTS 
Part I introduced a general, transsubstantive pattern. Access 
justice works only in a superficial sense. When the rubber hits the 
road and we start counting who utilizes (and how often) the pub-
licly provided open access programs, differential access rates may 
correlate with income and sophistication. Access justice policies 
that are not specifically targeted to needy recipients but are in-
stead “universal” or “neutral” or “open” can be a perk to sophisti-
cated recipients who are comparatively competent at collecting 
the benefits, particularly if they do not bear a commensurate 
share of the cost. 
I will now examine this paradox in the context of what is per-
haps the most important and controversial access justice debate 
of recent times: access to courts. This is a debate over a distinct 
institutional issue: Should the law enforce mass-market arbitra-
tion agreements that require aggrieved individuals to file their 
complaints in an arbitration forum chosen by the commercial 
party with whom they dealt? These predispute agreements over 
mandatory arbitration effectively bar the plaintiffs’ access to 
courts of law and replace it with what many regard as inferior, 
stingier arbitration justice, stripped of the threat of class action. 
 
 122 See Randall J. Pozdena, Smart Growth and Its Effects on Housing Markets: The 
New Segregation *33 (National Center for Public Policy Research, Nov 2002), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NC9A-UA6A (“[T]he burden of site-supply restrictions will fall dispropor-
tionately on poor and minority families.”). 
 123 Id at *v. 
 124 Portland is ranked among the top ten least affordable cities in America. See Erik 
Gunther, Start Saving Now! These Are the 10 Least Affordable Cities in America (National 
Association of Realtors, Jan 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G9EC-CSFQ. 
 125 See Samuel R. Staley, Jefferson G. Edgens, and Gerard C.S. Mildner, A Line in 
the Land: Urban-Growth Boundaries, Smart Growth, and Housing Affordability *23–24 
(Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No 263), archived at http://perma.cc/KAK6 
-DUGR; Joe Streckert, How We Got Here (Portland Mercury, Aug 5, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L8G6-FUCM. 
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A. The Debate over Mandatory Arbitration 
Despite heroic efforts by various courts to strike them as un-
conscionable, mandatory arbitration clauses are enforceable.126 
Commentators, however, are bluntly critical of this jurispru-
dence, which they argue limits people’s access to judicial forums, 
and potentially to any kind of remedy. “[A]n arbitration clause 
causes our right to jury trial to vanish.”127 “Large areas of Ameri-
can life and commerce have silently been insulated from the law-
suit culture.”128 Critics of arbitration clauses challenge the super-
ficial notion that such contractual provisions represent the joint 
interests of both businesses and consumers.129 These arrange-
ments are not negotiated, and are often not even noticed at the 
time of contracting. The fine print authorizing them is merely “pa-
perwork,” not informed consent, and the choice whether to agree 
to mandatory arbitration is not much of a choice when all vendors 
who compete in some product space require an agreement to ar-
bitrate.130 Of course, it is possible that waivers of access to courts 
are rational. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has said, “People are 
free to opt for bargain-basement adjudication” because “[i]n com-
petition, prices adjust and both sides gain. ‘Nothing but the best’ 
may be the motto of a particular consumer but is not something 
the legal system foists on all consumers.”131 Arbitration clauses are 
like other features of the deal—they “[a]ll stand or fall together.”132 
 
 126 See AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333, 337–38 (2011) (describing such 
holdings by the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and a California district 
court); American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S Ct 2304, 2312 (2013). 
 127 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule 
of Law 108 (Princeton 2013). 
 128 Patti Waldmeir, How America Is Privatising Justice by the Back Door, Fin Times 
12 (June 30, 2003). 
 129 See, for example, Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash U L Q 637, 642–43 (1996) 
(“[I]t is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by 
parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial arbitration forced upon 
unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through the use of form contracts.”). 
 130 Radin, Boilerplate at 7–9 (cited in note 127). 
 131 Carbajal v H & R Block Tax Services, Inc, 372 F3d 903, 906 (7th Cir 2004) 
(Easterbrook). 
 132 Oblix, Inc v Winiecki, 374 F3d 488, 491 (7th Cir 2004) (Easterbrook). 
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Nevertheless, the overwhelming conclusion among critics is 
that arbitration has the “capacity to reduce, if not altogether elim-
inate, access to the courts and to the law.”133 This concern of lim-
ited access to law has two primary aspects, one relating to com-
pensation and the other to deterrence.134 The compensatory 
concern is based on the thought that litigation provides superior 
recovery because it is cheaper to file and to pursue, granting more 
effective procedural weapons (like discovery). It is also public and 
thus has precedential value, and it allows for more substantial 
remedies. The deterrence concern is based on the limited incen-
tive of consumers to enforce small claims. One artifact of arbitra-
tion clauses is the class action waiver.135 Critics believe that “such 
clauses should not be enforced at all because any gains from ag-
gregate litigation in terms of better incentives to take care ex ante 
would be lost.”136 As a result, consumers as a group are disfavored, 
whereas the more powerful businesses benefit.137 
 
 133 Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Sep-
arability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L 
Rev 819, 822 (2003). 
 134 See Heather Bromfield, Comment, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class 
Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 43 UC Davis L Rev 315, 341–46 (2009); Richard 
A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Ar-
bitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum L Rev 1872, 1904–09 (2006). See also Jean R. Sternlight, 
Tsunami: AT&T Mobile LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 Or L Rev 703, 
704–05 (2012) (noting that after Concepcion the lack of an ability to arbitrate on behalf of 
a class of plaintiffs was likely to reduce access to any sort of remedy for those who had 
been harmed); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers 
from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw L Rev 87, 89 (2012) (stating that 
Concepcion “has greatly reduced the likelihood that consumers can enforce certain of their 
legal rights in any forum”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Busi-
ness: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 
Wis L Rev 33, 37 (noting that compelled arbitration takes the ability to access courts away 
from plaintiffs). 
 135 See Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not 
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St J Disp Res 433, 444 (2010) (finding that “all of the 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts [in the study] contained a class arbitration 
waiver”). See also Kimberly L. Intagliata, Comment, Improving the Quality of Care in 
Nursing Homes: Class Action Impact Litigation, 73 U Colo L Rev 1013, 1031–32 (2002) 
(discussing how class actions give access to plaintiffs who would otherwise have claims 
that were too small to bring, and therefore deter potential defendants from harming pa-
tients in nursing homes); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 Va L Rev 1871, 1874 (2002) (stat-
ing that “[c]lass action is indispensible to achieving the social objective of minimizing the 
sum of accident costs through tort deterrence”). 
 136 Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Jus-
tice Systems, in Horst Eidenmüller, ed, Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dis-
pute Resolution 347, 394 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2013). 
 137 See Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 Harv J 
Legis 281, 284 (2002) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act has been used to make 
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My goal is to explore the validity of the access-to-courts dis-
tributive concerns. It turns out, however, that the question 
whether arbitration renders justice less accessible to consumers 
as a group is difficult to untangle empirically (more on this later). 
Thus, as a first step, I want to ask a subtler question: Assuming 
that arbitration limits the incidence of lawsuits and the magni-
tude of recovery, who among consumers are affected more? What 
are the characteristics of the consumers who, in the absence of 
arbitration clauses, would have litigated their claims? Are there 
consumers that perhaps lose nothing, or even benefit from the ar-
bitration mandate? If consumers vary in their sophistication, ed-
ucation, psyche, wealth, vulnerability, type and size of injuries, 
litigiousness, or other traits, does the denial of access to courts 
hurt weaker consumers disproportionately more? Or does it hurt 
the more sophisticated consumers? Rather than looking at con-
sumers as a homogeneous group—as most of the literature explic-
itly or implicitly does—my goal is to unpack the rank of “consum-
ers” and identify the adversely affected subgroups. 
The concerns over access justice would be all the more pow-
erful and urgent if the denial of litigation is disproportionately 
affecting weak consumers. Indeed, this is a plausible conjecture: 
those who have fewer resources and less sophistication are less 
likely to be able to pay the upfront fees of filing for arbitration, 
and thus will be denied any kind of redress.138 On the other hand, 
the concerns over access to courts would be weakened if it turns 
out that only elite groups of litigious consumers are adversely af-
fected by the limited access to courts, and that—in an unappreci-
ated way, by reducing firms’ costs of litigation and the prices of 
products—weak consumers benefit. 
There are two steps to the remaining argument. The first, in 
Part II.B, applies the framework developed above and examines 
the direction of the cross-subsidy. If equal access to courts is de-
ployed differentially by people, who benefits and who loses? Is it 
a regressive policy? The second step, developed in Part II.B, is to 
examine the possibility of a different channel of access—“vicarious 
access.” This is a unique feature of access to courts, not present in 
 
arbitration “a tool for the powerful to exert authority over the less powerful”); Lee Goldman, 
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 Harv Negotiation L Rev 171, 
193 (2003). 
 138 See Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 L & 
Contemp Probs 133, 135 (Winter/Spring 2004) (“For substantial claims, the services’ fees 
alone likely make access to arbitration infeasible, and actual costs are often made even 
greater by the terms of the arbitration agreement.”). 
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other equal access policies, whereby the value of open access is 
enjoyed not directly but through representatives. Access to courts 
allows vicarious access through class actions. Because class actions 
are a method to distribute the benefits of litigation to those who 
otherwise fail to utilize it, is there still a regressive cross-subsidy? 
B. The Litigation Cross-Subsidy 
The working hypothesis in much of the commentary on liti-
gation versus arbitration is that consumers would fare better in 
litigation in securing remedies vis-à-vis their business rivals.139 I 
will take this premise—that arbitration is effective in reducing 
firms’ liability—as a starting point. Some empirical work has con-
tested it, suggesting that consumers and employees actually fare 
well in arbitration, relative to litigation. Indeed, labor unions often 
negotiate for arbitration in collective agreements, and surely they 
wouldn’t do so to reduce their potential recovery.140 But the em-
pirical question remains open and widely controversial.141 
My argument, instead, is that if arbitration indeed reduces 
consumers’ access to redress, this effect is potentially favorable 
not only to firms, but also to the weakest subgroups of consumers. 
This is a direct application of the strong form of the regressive 
cross-subsidy idea. Access to courts is an access justice policy that, 
although available to all, is disproportionately utilized by the so-
phisticated elite, and these benefits are partially paid for by all 
consumers, including the less sophisticated consumers, through 
higher prices. Accordingly, if indeed arbitration restricts access to 
 
 139 See, for example, David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revo-
lution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 Georgetown L J 57, 99–116 
(2015) (investigating empirically whether consumers are disadvantaged in arbitration and 
concluding that “consumers facing high-level and super repeat-playing defendants are 
strongly disadvantaged in the arbitral forum relative to consumers facing one-shot 
defendants”). 
 140 See Peter Florey, Labor & Employment Arbitration: Questions for the Late ’90s, 52 
Disp Res J 66, 70 (Spring 1997) (quoting multiple scholars giving unions credit for the 
success of arbitration in the context of collective bargaining); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 
1990s, 74 Denver U L Rev 1017, 1020 (1996) (stating that it is usually assumed that col-
lective bargaining agreements will contain arbitration clauses); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme 
Court without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett and the System of Collective Action and 
Collective Bargaining Established by the National Labor Relations Act, 65 U Miami L Rev 
1063, 1072 (2011) (stating that labor arbitration is often viewed by parties “as an extension 
of the collective-bargaining process” and is therefore favored) (emphasis omitted). 
 141 This question was the topic of a symposium at the University of Michigan entitled 
Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad 
Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 U Mich J L Ref 777 (2008). 
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lawsuits and to recovery, it removes the regressive cross-subsidy. 
A nonsuing consumer who wants to pay low prices should thus 
root for a contract that maximally restricts access to courts. 
1. Who benefits from access to courts? 
When access to courts and to litigation is free and unre-
stricted, who takes advantage of it? In order to pursue any kind 
of litigation strategy, the aggrieved claimant has to understand 
that her rights were violated (and that a court can be similarly 
persuaded). She must also have enough of a litigious nature to 
undertake the ordeal of an adversary proceeding. She then has to 
find an attorney that will take the case. And, importantly, the 
claimant has to have the patience to await a remedy that some-
times takes years to secure. True, a settlement might be reached 
early, but without a credible threat to litigate the case all the way 
to judgment, the settlement amount would not reflect the merits. 
These are characteristics that are more likely to be found in 
wealthier, more educated, and more sophisticated consumers.142 
Take the first link in this chain—the ability to recognize that a 
violation occurred. The consumer has to know her rights, mean-
ing she has to be educated enough to read, understand, and ex-
ploit the information written (sometimes in legal language) in the 
consumer contract, the employment handbook, or other lengthy 
disclosures. For example, if the consumer was hit with a large 
unexpected fee, or received an inferior product, or discovered that 
her personal information is being harvested from her account, the 
consumer needs to verify that the fee, the product, or the data 
collection was a violation of the fine print terms to which the con-
sumer agreed sometime in the past (or during one of the numer-
ous updates since). Few, even among the very literate, know how 
to find these documents, and fewer still know what they really say. 
But while the agony of reading fine print is a shared experi-
ence among all, it is well documented that poor, less educated con-
sumers are less likely to successfully read and understand the 
terms of contracts, which are complex legal texts. To recognize a 
violation and articulate a complaint, consumers have to be com-
petent in performing nontrivial numeracy skills, including some 
 
 142 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Society Rev 95 (1974). 
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understanding of risk and probabilities—which they often lack.143 
One study suggests that only 3 to 4 percent of the population can 
understand the language in which contracts are drafted.144 And it 
is no secret that low levels of literacy are concentrated among low-
income people and minorities.145 Maybe things can be improved 
by financial literacy campaigns and “heightened” disclosures, but 
as we saw already,146 mandated disclosures are the gods sending 
nuts to those who have no teeth. Disclosure operates to exacer-
bate the regressivity. The more disclosure-trained and cautious 
are the recipients of financial literacy training (who are dispropor-
tionately the well-educated), the greater their relative advantage.147 
But weak consumers are less likely to seek remedies in court 
for reasons beyond their poor ability to read boilerplate and un-
derstand their rights. The poor and the disadvantaged endure 
more abuse and exploitation by dealing with lower-quality ven-
dors. For them, legal problems are not discrete extraordinary 
events but rather the course of everyday life.148 As a result, their 
expectations for decent treatment—and for remedies in the event 
that it is not rendered—may be comparatively depressed, and 
their propensity to turn to the court for resolution may be lower.149 
Further, when they are defrauded, the magnitudes of their 
claims are smaller. True, some violations of rights lead to fixed, 
 
 143 See Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy: Evidence and 
Implications for Financial Education *2 (TIAA-CREF Institute, May 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7S65-K4CU. 
 144 See Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan L 
& Pol Rev 233, 237, 239 (2002) (“The degree of literacy required to comprehend the average 
disclosure form and key contract terms simply is not within the reach of the majority of 
American adults.”). 
 145 See Mark Kutner, et al, Literacy in Everyday Life: Results from the 2003 National 
Assessment of Adult Literacy *15, 31 (National Center for Education Statistics, Apr 2007), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2YVG-UUV7. 
 146 See Part I.D.1. 
 147 See, for example, Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch Jr, and Richard G. Netemeyer, 
Financial Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 Mgmt 
Sci 1861, 1874 (2014) (finding “that financial literacy has less effect in low-income samples”). 
 148 See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L J 1049, 1050 (1970) 
(“Poor people do not lead settled lives into which the law seldom intrudes; they are con-
stantly involved with the law in its most intrusive forms.”). 
 149 For example, low-income parents are more “fatalistic” about children’s exposure to 
hazards and less influenced by safety warnings, even though their children are dispropor-
tionately exposed to these hazards. David Klein, Societal Influences on Childhood Acci-
dents, 12 Accident Analysis & Prevention 275, 275 (1980). See also Marcel E. Conrad, Patricia 
Brown, and Marcia G. Conrad, Fatalism and Breast Cancer in Black Women, 125 Annals 
Internal Med 941, 942 (1996) (finding that even when breast cancer screening was pro-
vided at no cost, few minority patients availed themselves of the resources). 
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lump sum recovery (for example, statutory damages), or to recov-
ery that is in theory independent of wealth (for example, medical 
expenses). But many violations lead to losses that do depend on 
income.150 Wealthier people buy more products and pay higher 
prices, which account for larger nominal losses when fraud or vi-
olation occurs. And wealthier people may suffer larger losses 
when recovery is measured by earning capacity, lost income, lost 
property value, lost opportunity, or other consequential harms. 
If the poor have lower nominal claims, they also become less 
attractive clients for attorneys. As it is, there is evidence that only 
a small fraction of individuals with claims who seek private rep-
resentation are able to obtain counsel.151 The great majority of 
low-income claimants cannot afford legal counsel and cannot find 
their way into the court system.152 Small claims leave less recov-
ery once litigation costs are netted, and there is plenty of evidence 
that litigation indeed takes longer than arbitration153 (and, although 
the possibility of settlements blurs the empirical comparison, set-
tlements in the shadow of costly litigation are likely to be stin-
gier). And among people who go to court and self-represent, the 
poor and less educated are also less effective in advocating their 
claims.154 There is convincing evidence that litigation is a cost-
effective dispute resolution strategy only for high-stakes claims. 
Most poor consumers don’t have such claims. 
Moreover, courts operate slowly and court-awarded remedies 
take time to secure. The higher the consumer-plaintiff’s discount 
rate and the more liquidity-constrained she is, the less valuable 
the delayed recovery is (even if it is compounded by interest), and 
 
 150 See Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-framing 
the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U Mich J L Ref 843, 855 (2008) (noting 
that “employee salary is likely to correlate positively with award size”). 
 151 See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 
30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 29, 58 (1998) (“The result of these formidable hurdles is that 
most people with claims against their employer are unable to obtain counsel, and thus 
never receive justice.”); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimi-
nation: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, 50 Disp Res J 40, 45 
(Oct–Dec 1995). For more data on low- and moderate-income households’ access to attor-
neys, see generally Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Services and American-Style 
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 L & Society Rev 79 (2007) (finding that indigent clients have 
become increasingly dependent on pro bono programs). 
 152 See Nourit Zimmerman and Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access 
to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 Fordham Urban L J 473, 478 (2009). 
 153 See Weidemaier, 41 U Mich J L Ref at 846 (cited in note 150). 
 154 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empiri-
cal Evidence, 41 U Mich J L Ref 813, 831 (2008) (noting that, for resolving small claims, 
arbitration may be the cheapest option). 
 1802 The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1755 
   
the more amenable the consumer is to accepting a small settle-
ment rather than “vindicating” her legal rights through a full-
blown judgment.155 
Finally, litigation is risky business. The greater the uncer-
tainty about the outcome of litigation, the less beneficial it is for 
risk-averse plaintiffs, who would prefer lower settlements to the 
uncertainty of litigating the case fully.156 It is widely accepted that 
poorer individuals exhibit higher degrees of risk aversion,157 and 
thus value the prospect of the litigation “damages lottery” less. 
All these findings suggest that the litigation right would be 
more valuable, and more commonly realized, with better returns 
and larger settlements, by stronger consumers—those who know 
their rights and can effectively pursue them against a sophisti-
cated business opponent or its experienced insurer. There are 
some data to support this, although they are mostly anecdotal and 
not systematic. Some evidence comes from the area of employee 
claims—in which, even when litigation is permitted, there are al-
most no cases of recovery by low-paid wageworkers. Professors 
Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill concluded that “the ab-
sence of cases of this type is likely explained by the fact that 
lower-paid employees seem to lack ready access to court, as other 
researchers have reported.”158 Hill showed that, unlike arbitra-
tion, litigation is unrealistic for employees with incomes below 
$60,000.159 And Professor Ted St. Antoine posits that defendants 
“wait out most smaller claims, assuming employees will not be 
able to pursue them in court.”160 
 
 155 See Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from 
Panel Data, 99 J Polit Econ 54, 72 (1991) (finding that “[p]oor households are likely to 
possess relatively high rates of time preference”). 
 156 See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty *2–3 (Tel Aviv University 
Law Faculty Paper 30, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/X9PX-HS3L.  
 157 See Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos and Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk 
Averse?, 36 Econ Inquiry 620, 629 (1998) (confirming findings that “relative risk aversion 
decreases as household wealth increases”). 
 158 Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment 
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp Res J 44, 45 (Nov 2003–Jan 2004). See also 
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration 
under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 Ohio St J Disp Res 777, 
782 (2003) (“Studies to date indicate that only highly-compensated employees are able to 
gain access to the court systems for their employment-related claims.”). 
 159 See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 
Disp Res J 8, 10–11 (May–July 2003). 
 160 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 
41 U Mich J L Ref 783, 790 (2008). 
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Additional hints that courts are accessed disproportionately 
by the elite come from litigation of health benefits. Some legal 
systems recognize a constitutional claim for a “right to health,” 
which allows individuals to seek court protection of their right to 
various medical treatments. A study in Brazil (where a right to 
health is recognized) showed that the litigation that ensued under 
this access-to-medicine paradigm was largely to the benefit of 
elites, as it was used to secure high-tech and experimental treat-
ments.161 The vast majority of the cases litigated were brought by 
a privileged minority seeking access to “high-cost medicines, such 
as new types of insulin for diabetes and new cancer drugs,” that 
were otherwise excluded by health administrators because of low 
effectiveness.162 It was shown that the right-to-health litigation 
was largely concentrated in the richest regions, where a small mi-
nority “is able to use the court system to its advantage.”163 Access 
to courts is otherwise “beyond the means and reach of most poor 
Brazilians.”164 Further, the cost of these augmented treatments is 
borne by others. As state resources devoted to health and provi-
sion of medications are fixed, such litigation reallocates general 
health expenditures, which would otherwise benefit broader pop-
ulations, in favor of the litigating minority. 
Finally, more evidence about disproportionate utilization of 
access to courts comes from India’s experience with “Public Interest 
Litigation.” This is a judicial procedure “for enhancing the social 
and economic rights of disadvantaged and marginalized groups in 
India.”165 But a World Bank study found that what began as “an 
effort on the part of the courts to speak to [ ] poverty, social exclu-
sion, and powerlessness” has increasingly grown to be a forum for 
middle-class lifestyle grievances.166 The report found some evi-
dence that “judicial attitudes are less favorably inclined to the 
claims of the poor than they used to be” and that the win rate for 
marginalized groups is lower, and increasingly so, relative to that 
of advantaged individuals.167 As the examples provided above 
 
 161 Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Harming the Poor through Social Rights Litigation: 
Lessons from Brazil, 89 Tex L Rev 1643, 1660–62 (2011). 
 162 Id at 1661. 
 163 Id at 1662. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? 
*i (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5109, Nov 2009), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/9GG3-LKST. 
 166 Id at *8. 
 167 Id at *13. 
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show, it is unsurprising that peasants do not do as well as lawyers 
and teachers in court. 
2. Who pays for access to courts? 
As shown above, litigation is regressive in the weak sense, as 
sophisticated and higher-income people disproportionately enjoy 
its benefits. This Section shows that it is also regressive in the 
strong sense by answering the following questions: Do weaker 
consumers who do not enjoy its benefits nevertheless pay for its 
cost? Is the added recovery that litigation affords the high-income 
group of consumers financed, at least in part, by the poor and un-
sophisticated consumers? 
Here, I can point only to indirect effects. First, let us return 
to the assumption mentioned at the outset of this Section—that 
arbitration is cheaper for firms than litigation is (an assumption 
regularly made by many commentators, in suggesting that ven-
dors draft arbitration terms to reduce their legal exposure and 
save money). The most compelling reason for this assumption is 
the cost of liability. Arbitration that effectively inhibits lawsuits 
reduces the liability exposures of firms, and likely also the cost of 
liability insurance.168 Like any other cost, it affects the price of the 
service. In highly competitive industries, most if not all of this 
cost would be rolled into higher prices to consumers, whereas in 
concentrated industries, only part of this cost would be borne by 
consumers, and the rest by the vendors, depending on the elastic-
ity of demand.169 
One might object to this pass-through argument. A firm can-
not pass along its litigation costs in the form of higher prices with-
out losing its market share. The cost of litigation and liability, so 
goes the argument, would either lower firms’ profits (without 
pass-through to consumers) or induce firms to avoid malfeasance 
in the first place. Either way, there would be no added cost borne 
by the nonsuing customers.170 The latter argument (deterrence) 
will be discussed in the next Section. For now, it suffices to recog-
nize that even firms that offer excellent products and enjoy 
growth of their market share face an endless trickle of potential 
suits. It would be naïve to think that the litigation risk—and the 
 
 168 See Maltby, 30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev at 31–32 (cited in note 151) (finding that 
mandatory arbitration clauses were used to reduce potential litigation costs). 
 169 Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 367–68 (cited in note 2). 
 170 See Adam Levitin, The Access-to-Justice Myth (Credit Slips, Aug 1, 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/8JEP-7H6Q. 
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cost of resolving it—could be fully petered out by “good behavior.” 
In competitive industries, it is also less likely that firms would 
absorb the added cost of litigation without any pass-through. And 
if other firms in the industry face a similar magnitude of litigation 
risk, the effect on market share would be a wash: all firms would 
exhibit some increase in prices. 
Thus, as long as some price effect exists, it tends to be shared 
equally by all consumers. Unless vendors find ways to unbundle 
the legal terms and sell incremental litigation rights for add-on 
prices, people pay for features regardless of their propensity to 
utilize them. A nondisclaimable right to litigate is merely a type 
of mandatory quality improvement, and like any other such fea-
ture, it effectuates a cross-subsidy in favor of the group that en-
joys it more. This is true whether the quality feature is part of the 
product (like the size of a hard disk) or part of the contract. Man-
datory warranties, rights to withdraw, or remedies make prod-
ucts more expensive and might well reflect the preferences of 
some consumers. But for lower-income consumers, these protec-
tions are harder to invoke and to afford. If your budget permits 
only the discounted items on the menu, a mandate to serve only 
the high-end, high-price offering is bad news. 
And so, if consumers have to pay for access to courts, many of 
them would prefer low prices over free access. As Professor James 
White bluntly put it, “For a nickel or a dime, almost all of us would 
. . . agree to arbitrate.”171 Especially those for whom “a nickel or a 
dime” matters. 
3. Corrective versus distributive justice. 
I have argued that access to courts fits the template of regres-
sive access justice because elites are more likely to utilize it, inci-
dentally imposing the costs of their utilization (through higher 
product prices) on others. In this light, mandatory arbitration 
clauses that deny access to courts eliminate a privilege that 
weaker consumers rarely enjoy anyway and save them the cost of 
cross-subsidizing their more affluent fellow consumers. 
This Section continues the discussion by probing such ques-
tions as: Could the regressivity argument truly have such far-
reaching implications? Must the private right to seek redress for 
wrongs—a fundamental building block of private law and private 
 
 171 James J. White, Contracting under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis L Rev 723, 742. 
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ordering—come with such troubling redistributive effects? Is cor-
rective justice in private law inimical to distributive justice? 
Upon some reflection, the gist of this claim, that equal and 
open access to courts is regressive, may not be so surprising. It is 
well recognized that reparatory commands of corrective justice, 
even if applied universally, may not serve the goals of distributive 
justice. Rights to sue and seek redress are corrective treatments 
in the same way that drugs and health care are, working to rem-
edy harms and ills. Notwithstanding its corrective effects, health 
care is notoriously vulnerable to unfair allocation.172 
For one, litigation remedies seek to reinstate a preinjury 
state of affairs that was itself distributively unfair.173 Some are 
returned to their preinjury high state, and others to their low 
state. In addition, it would be a striking coincidence if the re-
sources allocated to correct past wrongs were distributed in an 
egalitarian fashion. Even priorities in criminal law and law en-
forcement, which are determined centrally and democratically, 
allocate corrective and protective measures without much con-
cern for any distributive criteria.174 This is all the more true in 
private law, which lacks a central headquarters and affords its 
corrective mechanism to anyone sophisticated enough to demand 
it. In general, the distribution of corrective measures may conflict 
with notions of distributive fairness, even if each measure itself 
is working perfectly well as a corrective device.175 
If private law remedies were cheap to secure, the access prob-
lem and its resulting redistributive imbalance would be trivially 
solved. But the ideal of access to courts is implemented through a 
 
 172 See M. Makinen, et al, Inequalities in Health Care Use and Expenditures: Empir-
ical Data from Eight Developing Countries and Countries in Transition, 78 Bull World 
Health Org 55, 56 (2000) (analyzing the unequal distribution of health care in a variety of 
countries and finding, for example, that, in Indonesia in 1990 only 12 percent of health 
care funding went to the poorest 20 percent of households whereas 29 percent went to the 
wealthiest 20 percent). 
 173 See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 80 (Harvard 1995) (“[C]orrective 
justice operates on entitlements without addressing the justice of the underlying distribution.”). 
 174 See generally Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 
Yale L J 507, 538–39 (1999). 
 175 See John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part 2. The Place of Distributive Justice 
*7 (Oxford Legal Research Paper No 62/2013, May 2013), archived at 
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cumbersome and expensive legal process. That such a process ef-
fectively denies practical access to the weaker sectors of the pop-
ulation is a feature already discussed. 
There are cases in which the luxury of selective access to 
courts imposes no cost on the poor. The affluent might be enjoy-
ing—and paying for—their exclusive access justice. There are 
markets for goods and services that are already segregated, serv-
ing either the affluent or the poor but not both sectors, with no 
intersector cross-subsidy. When five-star cruise ships, cosmetic 
surgeons, or golf resorts are sued by aggrieved patrons, patients, 
or players, any effect such suits might have on the prices of these 
services does not matter to the poor. It might be weakly objection-
able that the institution of public courts is serving only the afflu-
ent—that justice is a luxury good. But there is no redistribution 
away from the poor. 
Thus, the conflict with distributive fairness is more acute 
when the access to courts enjoyed by the elites comes at a real cost 
to the poor, through higher prices or limited choice. There are 
many markets for goods and services—for example, telecommu-
nications—that integrate a large cross-section of the population, 
the poor and the affluent, who pay similar prices for similar prod-
ucts. In these markets, the cross-subsidy is a real concern. 
Finally, the tradeoff between corrective and distributive fair-
ness that I highlighted is a descriptive observation. It is an unin-
tended consequence of selective access to courts. Nothing in the 
analysis here responds to the question how to balance the two 
justice concerns—correct private wrongs and redistribute fairly. 
The analysis merely informs such discussion. It debunks the 
myth that access to courts and to private law remedies is a slam-
dunk victory for justice concerns. Rather, consumers are not a 
monolithic battalion equally eager to conquer the lawsuit battle-
field. Victory for the alert few comes at a cost to the sluggish 
many. 
4. “Vicarious access”: The class action externality. 
I now want to consider an important objection to the claim 
that litigation is regressive. A crucial feature of existing arbitra-
tion clauses is the removal of class representation procedures. Ar-
bitration clauses not only turn plaintiffs away from litigation, 
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they also bar aggregation of suits.176 And class actions—even if 
filed solely by the alert and the sophisticated—provide a positive 
externality, which benefits all. Class action litigation produces 
this positive externality in two ways. First, class actions enable 
poorer class members to piggyback on the litigation efforts of oth-
ers and collect the same recovery without any deliberate effort. 
Second, if the threat of class actions changes the behavior of po-
tential defendants, this deterrent effect is a public good enjoyed 
by all consumers equally. As long as defendants are forced to pay 
for their wrongdoing, it doesn’t matter who sues and collects—the 
entire class, the class representative alone, or the class’s attor-
neys. The significant awards resulting from class actions serve 
the interests of potential (nonsuing) victims. 
This is an important qualification that, if true, diminishes the 
regressive concern developed above. It would make access to 
courts a sui generis species of access justice policy, one that pro-
vides neither direct benefit to the poor nor a disproportionate ben-
efit to the wealthy. Rather, it is a mechanism that builds on vi-
carious access—access by representatives—relying on the 
competence of these representatives to secure an equal benefit to all. 
As in any representative model, the main concern is the 
alignment of interests between the principals and the agent-
representative. To determine if the representative model reduces 
the regressivity concerns associated with free and open access to 
courts, the following Section asks: Do active litigants promote the 
compensatory and deterrence concerns that matter to nonliti-
gants? The discussion below examines the two potential class-
wide benefits of class actions—recovery to all and common deter-
rence. In a nutshell, the class-wide recovery effect is a phantom. 
Even successful class actions have very low recovery rates. The 
deterrence effect, however, is potentially more meaningful and 
could be a game changer, but only if the version of deterrence it 
produces is equally beneficial to all consumers. There are funda-
mental reasons to worry that it is not. 
a) Recovery to all?  Consider, first, the proposition that 
low-income consumers benefit from class-wide recovery: at no cost 
to them, the poor recover at least part of their loss. There is plenty 
of sobering evidence showing that only a tiny, negligible fraction 
 
 176 See Concepcion, 563 US at 351 (holding that a state-law prohibition on class action 
waivers conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act’s objectives). See also Italian Colors, 
133 S Ct at 2312. 
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of class members actually redeem their share of the class recov-
ery.177 For example, many class actions end with the attorneys 
representing the class being paid in cash, but the consumer-
members receiving coupons (although this practice is being cut 
back by law).178 The average redemption rate of various coupons 
has been measured to be somewhere between 1 percent and 6 per-
cent, mirroring the typical corporate-issued promotional coupon 
redemption rate.179 When Ford, for example, agreed to a settle-
ment in a class action over the Explorer SUV rollover problem, it 
was estimated to have a potential cost of up to $500 million. But 
in the end, far less than 1 percent of the eligible consumers (seventy-
five, out of a class of over one million) signed up to redeem their 
price-cut coupons.180 In another consumer class action alleging de-
ceptive business practices, members were entitled to total poten-
tial compensation of $64 million, but redemption was less than 
$1.8 million.181 
 
 177 See Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members at *2 (cited in note 50) (stating that 
settlements delivered funds to between 0.000006 percent and 12 percent of class mem-
bers); Redman v RadioShack Corp, 768 F3d 622, 628 (7th Cir 2014) (noting that “a little 
more than one half of one percent of the entire class . . . submitted claims for the coupon 
in response”); Christopher S. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems 
and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla L Rev 71, 119–20 (2007) (stating that it is not un-
common for a small percentage of class members to file claims); William Simon, Class 
Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 FRD 375, 379 (1973) (“Even after a set-
tlement, where class members are notified that they can share in the recovery merely by 
filing a simple proof of claim, only 10% to 15% bother to do so.”); Petruzzi’s, Inc v Darling–
Delaware Co, 983 F Supp 595, 605 (MD Pa 1996) (stating that when class members must 
file proof of their claim “response rates are often very small, and rarely exceed 50%”). 
 178 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4, codified 
in various sections of Title 28; Tanoh v Dow Chemical Co, 561 F3d 945, 952 (9th Cir 2009) 
(discussing the ways in which CAFA was intended to ensure fair recoveries for class members). 
 179 See James Tharin and Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness 
Act, 18 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1443, 1445 (2005); Thomas A. Dickerson and Brenda 
V. Mechmann, Consumer Class Actions and Coupon Settlements: Are Consumers Being 
Shortchanged?, 12 Advancing Consumer Interest 6, 7 (Fall/Winter 2000) (finding redemp-
tion rates of between 2 and 6 percent). 
 180 Jef Feeley and Myron Levin, Ford Accord Garners Less Than 1 Percent Participa-
tion, Bloomberg News (July 7, 2009).  
 181  Strong v Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc, 173 FRD 167, 172 (WD La 1997). See 
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between Private and Public Enforcement *4 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee 
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944–95 (D Minn 1994).  
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There are, to be sure, ways to increase participation rates by 
providing cash payments rather than coupons, autoenrollment 
with sticky opt-outs, and other tweaks. But in many cases any 
meaningful consumer recovery would require some active steps 
by the class members, triggering again the disproportionately low 
participation rate by those who do not read the boilerplate notices 
about the settlements. In fact, it is possible that various methods 
to make recovery more accessible would bump against the infor-
mation handicap or network handicap, and thus would exacer-
bate the disproportionate exclusion of the poor. 
Furthermore, because many of the compensation schedules 
are set in settlement negotiations by the plaintiff’s attorneys and 
the defendants—both of whom have little interest in maximizing 
the payouts to the anonymous class members who are under- 
represented in these settlement negotiations—the mechanism is 
inherently likely to shortchange the poorest among the class 
members. In fact, there is reason to expect that settlements in-
volving less-educated class members would tend to be especially 
abusive and self-dealing because class members in such settle-
ments rarely object to the settlement.182 
It is possible that the value of class litigation would accrue to 
all if the remedy granted is a forward-looking injunction or cor-
rective advertising. Attorneys will still get their lodestar fees for 
their success, and firms will happily comply by tweaking the lan-
guage of the product label or other negotiated disclosures. It is 
questionable, however, how much benefit, if any, these settle-
ments generate for the public. In the absence of compensation, 
the main remaining benefit is prevention though deterrence, to 
which I now turn. 
b) Deterrence.  What about the deterrence effect? Do class 
members—rich and poor alike—enjoy the compliance incentives 
that the threat of class action litigation creates? 
A deterrence effect would arise if class actions led to substan-
tial judgments and settlements that were paid out. Disgorgement 
of ill-gotten gains would be a powerful deterrent of misconduct. 
The deterrence effect would diminish if these judgments and set-
tlements were only partially cashed out by consumers. The above 
Section demonstrated that redemption rates are low, but busi-
nesses do worry about the cost of settling class action litigation, 
 
 182 See Leslie, 59 Fla L Rev at 109–10 (cited in note 177) (discussing the futility of 
class members’ objections to proposed settlements). 
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or else they would not draft class action waivers. And so, it is 
plausible that costly litigation is generated even with feeble re-
demption rates, forcing businesses to account for this cost in plan-
ning their primary conduct and to take extra care, thus delivering 
better goods and services to all. 
Ideally, class actions would target the firms that commit the 
worst offenses and deliver the worst bargains. They would target 
producers who deceive consumers (for example, by falsely labeling 
products and charging higher prices); or manufacturers of defec-
tive and injurious products; or businesses that fraudulently bill 
consumers for more than the businesses are entitled. But since 
class actions are often driven by the financial incentives of the 
attorneys launching them, they are selected according to a differ-
ent criterion: the ability and willingness of the defendant to settle. 
If the set of firms that are willing to settle is different from the 
set of those that commit the worst offenses, class actions may 
“underdeter, overdeter or deter the wrong parties.”183 
Is there such divergence between the worst offenders and the 
most-likely-to-settle defendants? Class actions are likely to target 
the firms that have deep pockets and strong reputations to de-
fend. Reputation and wealth are usually signs of success—badges 
that only firms that developed desirable brands can wear. If a fea-
ture of the product malfunctions, or if the firm promoted a feature 
that caused disappointment to consumers, the firm with the 
strong brand reputation and large cash reserves would have more 
incentive and capacity to redress the problem to avoid the nega-
tive reviews, the reputation penalty, and the resulting drop in 
sales—all arising without litigation.184 If instead such firms stone-
wall and refuse to redress a complaint, it may likely be the type 
of complaint that invokes a technical or frivolous violation, one 
that does not hurt the firm’s market share. 
To be sure, there are many meritorious claims against shady 
businesses specializing, for example, in the gray areas of sub-
prime lending (for example, usury cap violators, credit-repair or-
ganizations, and questionable debt collection practices),185 and 
 
 183 Thomas B. Leary, The FTC and Class Actions: Remarks before the Class Action 
Litigation Summit (FTC, June 26, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/S9HX-JEJZ.  
 184 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without 
Law, 6 Eur Rev Contract L 221 (2010) (emphasizing that, absent legal protections, con-
sumers would be even more reliant on brand reputation and would develop more sophisti-
cated methods of measuring brand performance). 
 185 See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good 
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 
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pursuing them through class actions would be particularly advan-
tageous to the poor, who are disproportionately victimized by such 
defendants. Class actions in these areas could at times provide an 
important supplement to public enforcement. Indeed, many 
consumer-credit protection statutes specifically envision class ac-
tions as an effective way of deterring patterns of creditor misbe-
havior, and the right to recover statutory damages makes the 
award of damages in class action litigation easy to administer.186 
Arbitration clauses effectively shut down this avenue of enforce-
ment in areas that might directly benefit from increased deter-
rence. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court’s approval of arbi-
tration clauses in credit-repair organizations’ contracts, which 
are mostly sold to the poor by nonreputable firms, is more harm-
ful than the Court’s similar approval of a cellphone contract’s ar-
bitration clause. The irony is that the Court’s liberal bloc seemed 
more energized in opposing arbitration clauses in the latter case 
(four dissenting justices) than in the former (only one dissent).187 
Still, it is questionable whether businesses that specialize in 
deliberate advantage taking of less educated and poorer borrow-
ers, like credit-repair organizations,188 would be effectively de-
terred by the threat of private attorney general suits. In such 
cases, a coordinated agency-based enforcement campaign might 
be superior as a regulatory technique. The worst wrongdoers may 
not be the ones with the deepest pockets that attract private actions. 
 
SC L Rev 473, 556 (2000) (discussing abusive terms and practices associated with sub-
prime loans, including balloon payments and prepayment penalties); Leah A. Plunkett 
and Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How States Protect Consum-
ers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 Suffolk U L Rev 31, 36 
(2011) (discussing the criminal punishments for violating the usury cap). 
 186 See, for example, Credit Repair Organizations Act § 409, Pub L No 104-208, 110 
Stat 3009-455, 3009-459 (1996), codified at 15 USC § 1679g (providing for statutory dam-
ages and attorney’s fees if a credit-repair organization harms a consumer); Consumer 
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 § 2412, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-426, 3009-446, 
codified as amended at 15 USC § 1681n (establishing damages for willing or knowing non-
compliance); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 813, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874, 881 
(1977), codified at 15 USC § 1692k (establishing civil liability for debt collectors who fail 
to comply with the provisions of this statute); Truth in Lending Act § 130, 82 Stat at 157 
(1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1640 (establishing civil liability and the ability 
to bring suit as a class for violations of the act). 
 187 Compare Concepcion, 563 US at 357–67 (Breyer dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan), with CompuCredit Corp v Greenwood, 132 S Ct 665, 676–80 
(2012) (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 188 See Credit Repair Scams (FTC, Aug 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/R3FG 
-FVAH; Emily Patterson, Don’t Fall for Credit Repair Scams (Better Business Bureau, 
June 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FLS4-UPYW. 
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And an effective enforcement campaign might require investiga-
tive resources aimed against a network of disperse fly-by-night de-
fendants,189 with forward-looking as well as criminal remedies, ra-
ther than anecdotal suits that end up with meek settlements, that 
compensate the lawyers more effectively than the victims, and 
that do little to shut down the systematic abuse. 
It is also important to imagine different ways in which firms 
would be affected by class actions. In general, increased liability 
could have several effects. First, it could lead firms to shut down 
an entire activity as unprofitable, and, as a result, some consum-
ers would be hurt. Some forms of high-risk, high-cost lending not 
prohibited by statute, or FDA-approved drugs with harmful side 
effects, have both substantial benefits and substantial costs. 
Shutting down their distribution because of high liability costs, 
instead of through fundamental regulatory cost-benefit analysis, 
may hurt consumers. 
Second, increased liability could lead firms to continue the ac-
tivity but make sure they comply with the technical legal standards. 
Manufacturers of products would have an incentive to reduce lia-
bility risks, but many of the precautions that accomplish this goal 
would be ones designed by lawyers, not product engineers. It 
might not be necessary to reduce the actual hazard of the product 
if liability could be curbed by drafting longer warning labels or 
disseminating new disclosures—avoiding claims of negligent fail-
ure to warn or deception. For example, if AT&T Mobility wants to 
advertise “free phones” yet charges sales tax on the hypothetical 
retail value, its fear that the ads might lead to liability for decep-
tive false advertising could have the sole effect of longer fine print 
disclaimers. The AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion190 case—in 
which a class action plaintiff alleged fraud on behalf of all cus-
tomers who received free phones but were charged sales tax—
ended up with the landmark Supreme Court decision to validate 
the arbitration clause and to effectively diminish consumers’ ac-
cess to class action litigation.191 But an opposite result, securing 
access to class action litigation, could merely put firms’ lawyers 
on greater guard. AT&T would still advertise free phones and still 
charge sales tax on the retail value, but would lawyer up prior to 
 
 189 See Marc Weber Tobias, Credit Repair Companies: How to Avoid Being Scammed 
(Forbes, May 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S6VQ-8LXN (discussing credit-repair 
organizations, scams, and the “fly-by-night” nature of many of these organizations). 
 190 563 US 333 (2011). 
 191 See id at 352. 
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any public communication as a precaution against litigation and 
would add an “asterisk” to its pamphlets—“taxes and other 
charges may apply.” Access to litigation morphs into access to in-
formation, but disclosure—as discussed above192—triggers the in-
formation handicap and is often a regressive policy, serving the 
sophisticates who read it. 
Third, there is the price effect. Could it be that class actions 
improve products and behavior but render them too costly for the 
poor? Surely, products are improved when they are more closely 
scrutinized by courts or asked to meet higher regulatory standards. 
But one does not need to subscribe to the “Chicago School” eco-
nomic approach to recognize that better products are more closely 
scrutinized by courts and cost more in competitive and noncom-
petitive markets alike. People make different price-quality 
tradeoffs, and some consumers would prefer the higher quality 
even at a higher price. But not all consumers would benefit. Other 
consumers, particularly those with more constrained budgets, 
prefer low prices over high quality. They shop at bargain base-
ments and search for marked-down products even if they have 
some defects. If class actions increase the price of products, it is 
quite possible that the poor may come out as net losers. 
To be sure, even a sharp price effect that liability may elicit 
could be universally desirable. For example, when the business is 
sued for deceptively hiding some service fees, the effect might be 
higher upfront prices, but here the higher prices are offset by 
lower overall latent fees.193 The higher price is a more salient in-
dex for the true cost of the purchase. Higher prices might also be 
desirable when consumers underestimate the risks and losses 
that might be associated with some products and fail to insure 
against loss or discount their value. And it is more than possible 
that these benefits associated with salient and informative up-
front prices would accrue disproportionately to the poor, who 
might otherwise be easier targets for the false allure of teaser 
prices and other cognitive traps.194 
 
 192 See Part I.C.3. 
 193 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Con-
sumer Markets 159 (Oxford 2012) (discussing how complexity helps lenders hide the true 
price of goods by hiding costs in less salient provisions). 
 194 In credit card markets, nonsalient prices and fees are incurred primarily by low-
income users and fund the perks enjoyed by more affluent users. See id at 100. It should 
be noted, however, that even a reduction and elimination of nonsalient prices may not 
remove the cross-subsidy inherent in credit card markets, because the loyalty perks en-
joyed by the affluent would be funded by interchange revenue, which in turn leads to 
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5. Access to courts: Conclusion. 
There is a seductive logic to the access-to-courts argument. 
Consumers should be entitled to vindicate their rights in forums 
that allow them full procedural rights and effective remedies and 
charge low filing fees. Boilerplate surrenders of these rights in 
favor of mandatory arbitration are therefore widely regarded as 
benefitting businesses at the expense of consumers. 
But this logic threatens to unravel when consumers are 
viewed not as a homogenous army of competent private litigators 
eager to burst out of the no-litigation chains, but rather as a het-
erogeneous class that includes a potentially large subgroup of less 
sophisticated and unlikely-to-sue people. Access to litigation 
might not help these folks; rather, it helps the stronger, more in-
formed, more litigious consumers. It becomes an access justice 
policy with regressive effects. 
What makes access to courts potentially unique in the more 
general access justice landscape is the litigation externality pro-
duced by class actions—the mechanism of vicarious access. Not 
all consumers have to sue for all consumers to benefit from the 
right to sue. Thus, the strongest case for access to courts and 
against mandatory arbitration might very well rest on this deter-
rence externality. It is possible that various types of socially 
harmful conduct are insufficiently deterred by public enforcement 
and that private class actions create better compliance, eliminate 
harmful conduct, and result in more accurate prices, to the benefit 
of all. True, class actions may also lead to unintended and unwel-
come burdens on some consumers, but it cannot be categorically 
said that such a distributive impact trumps the deterrence benefit 
to all consumers. 
It is nevertheless noteworthy that the problem of access to 
justice that predispute mandatory arbitration agreements create 
is falsely branded as the right of weaker victims to receive proper 
corrective redress. The benefit to weaker consumers comes nei-
ther from equal access nor from equal redress. Rather, it arises 
from the opposite: the fact that very few strong consumers actu-
ally sue and receive redress and that their actions force bad actors 
to pay for their misdeeds. Ironically, deterrence might work best 
 
higher retail prices charged to all. But see Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-
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if access were selective and if the payments of large judgments 
went to the pockets of rich plaintiffs’ attorneys, and almost never 
to compensate the truly poor and the worst-off among consumers. 
The more attorneys benefit from such suits, the more motivated 
they would be to produce this form of deterrence. But, I argue, all 
this requires great faith in the ability of the class action device to 
successfully target only the meritorious claims. It also requires 
even greater faith in the motivation of class action lawyers and 
the diligence of supervising judges to produce class remedies that 
engender valuable deterrence, rather than token gestures (like 
improved disclosures) that are themselves regressive. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article offers a framework to evaluate access justice pro-
grams. Such programs open their doors to a large class of people, 
but the basic insight of this Article is that not all qualified bene-
ficiaries walk through these doors. Programs that are primarily 
utilized by weaker and poorer populations and funded by public 
expenditures succeed in their goal to redistribute progressively. 
But other programs achieve the opposite. Their open access fea-
ture is exploited more by sophisticated elites, enjoying benefits 
subsidized by the less well off. They embody the paradox of access 
justice. 
The first half of this Article surveyed various access justice 
policies that are likely associated with a regressive pattern. One 
could, of course, perform the opposite exercise and line up various 
access programs that have a progressive bias. But because access 
justice commentary is inundated with progressive sentiment, the 
purpose of the cross-substantive survey here was to ring a caution 
bell. Good protective intentions can be gutted by unintended re-
distributive patterns. The very reasons that make some people 
more in need of protection make them also less likely to utilize 
open access opportunities. 
There is a demoralizing spirit to this argument. It suggests 
that the implementation of a protective agenda is more difficult 
to achieve than currently thought. Within the regulatory reper-
toire, policies can be arranged along the scale of their intrusive or 
paternalistic quality. At one end, there are the minimally inter-
vening regulatory techniques that leave extensive space for peo-
ple to make their own decisions (policies like mandated disclosure 
and statutory default rules). These devices are notoriously unhelp-
ful to the poor and to those less trained in the acumen of consumer 
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choice. At the other end of the spectrum, there are regulatory pol-
icies that leave little or no room for personal choice, relying in-
stead on mandated ioutcomes, in-kind allocations, and strict gov-
ernment supervision. Properly designed, such devices can surely 
improve the well-being of the weak, but they too are notorious for 
their costs and trade-offs. In the interstices lies the regulatory de-
vice of access justice. It goes beyond choice architecture by design-
ing, mandating, and paying for specific programs and requiring 
that they be open to all. But it stops short of picking out the ben-
eficiaries or mandating the outcomes, instead allowing people to 
vary their levels of utilization. Unfortunately, it is the continued 
reliance of this device on individuals’ affirmative decisions to seek 
out and to deploy the accessible program that paradoxically un-
dermines the redistributive goals of the policy, exposing it to trou-
bling and inequitable patterns. 
The second Part of the Article examined a specific open access 
policy—access to courts of law. It began by presenting the possi-
bility that this, too, is a policy benefitting elites while costing the 
public at large. The concern is that equal access is not enough, 
that it takes unique sophistication to vindicate one’s interest 
through public courts. Worse, the enhanced liability due to selec-
tive access could be rolled into the prices that everyone pays. 
But the cross-subsidy concern was only the beginning, not the 
conclusion, of the access-to-courts analysis. It is compounded by 
another factor: the benefits of litigation could extend to parties 
not actively accessing it. This is the deterrence externality due to 
class action procedures, what I called vicarious access. Thus, con-
tractual agreements that bar claim aggregation threaten to un-
dermine this proliferation of the otherwise-selective benefit of lit-
igation. We thus learn that the interest of consumers is not open 
access to courts for all. Individual suits are a useless privilege to 
most. Instead, their interest is consistent with highly restrictive 
access, channeled through class actions into a deterrent device. 
This interest is served if and only if the representatives select the 
right cases for litigation. If plaintiffs choose cases based on any-
thing other than the gravity of the underlying offense to the un-
derrepresented group, the litigation mechanism remains regressive. 
